Integrating Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (3 D) in the Naval Special Warfare operator by Sulick, Timothy S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-12
Integrating Defense, Diplomacy, and Development
(3 D) in the Naval Special Warfare operator
Sulick, Timothy S.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
INTEGRATING DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY, AND 
DEVELOPMENT (3 D) IN THE NAVAL SPECIAL 




William Fiack  





 Thesis Advisor:   Erik Jansen 
 Second Reader: Leo Blanken 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Integrating Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (3 D) in the Naval Special 
Warfare Operator 
6. AUTHOR(S)  William Fiack, William Roberts, Timothy Sulick 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.  IRB Protocol number ___N/A__________. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis initiates a conversation focused on enhancing Naval Special Warfare’s (NSW) current operational 
capacity.  U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) 2010 strategy challenges all special operators to be 
defter at working within the diplomatic, defense, and development (3-D) construct.  The “3-D” operator is 
USSOCOM’s contribution to the whole-of-government approach in the violent struggle against state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population (irregular warfare/IW).  To be effective at the IW 
mission NSW must select, train, and reward personnel and units to develop and sustain 3-D capabilities.  This thesis 
offers an analysis of the NSW organization and a proposal for developing the NSW 3-D teams and organization for 
non-traditional roles, such as those on embassy country teams.  The research uses organizational contingency theory 
and case studies as a framework to draw conclusions about cultural differences and training shortfalls and provide 
recommendations for how NSW can select the right 3-D operators.  It argues that the current SEAL team inter-
deployment training cycle (IDTC) prepares SEALs to excel in the kinetic, time-sensitive environment (traditional 
SEAL mission sets) but is inadequate for preparing SEALs for the diplomatic and developmental roles (non-
traditional, but essential) with interagency partners in U.S. embassies.  This thesis advocates that the NSW anchor 
detachment operators, rather than the traditional SEAL team operators, are the right personnel postured for roles 
working within the interagency because their training sets them up for success in the 3-D environment. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
97 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Naval Special Warfare 3-D (Defense, Diplomacy, Development) Operator 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
INTEGRATING DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY, AND DEVELOPMENT (3 D) IN THE 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OPERATOR  
 
 
William J. Fiack 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of California Davis, 2001 
 
William J. Roberts 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 2001 
 
Timothy S. Sulick  
Lieutenant, United States Navy  
B.A. San Diego State University, 1998 
 
 






NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2010 
 
Authors :  William Fiack 
   William Roberts 
   Timothy Sulick 
 
 








Gordon McCormick, PhD 
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT  
This thesis initiates a conversation focused on enhancing Naval Special Warfare’s (NSW) 
current operational capacity. U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) 2010 
strategy challenges all special operators to be defter at working within the diplomatic, 
defense, and development (3-D) construct. The “3-D” operator is USSOCOM’s 
contribution to the whole-of-government approach in the violent struggle against state 
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population (irregular 
warfare/IW). To be effective at the IW mission NSW must select, train, and reward 
personnel and units to develop and sustain 3-D capabilities. This thesis offers an analysis 
of the NSW organization and a proposal for developing the NSW 3-D teams and 
organization for non-traditional roles, such as those on embassy country teams.  The 
research uses organizational contingency theory and case studies as a framework to draw 
conclusions about cultural differences and training shortfalls and provide 
recommendations for how NSW can select the right 3-D operators. It argues that the 
current SEAL team inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) prepares SEALs to excel in 
the kinetic, time-sensitive environment (traditional SEAL mission sets) but is inadequate 
for preparing SEALs for the diplomatic and developmental roles (non-traditional, but 
essential) with interagency partners in U.S. embassies. This thesis advocates that the 
NSW anchor detachment operators, rather than the traditional SEAL team operators, are 
the right personnel postured for roles working within the interagency because their 
training sets them up for success in the 3-D environment. 
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A. SETTING THE STAGE: A CASE OF A “MISFIT”  
The U.S. Ambassador (Chief of Mission) to Nigeria sat at the head of a long 
mahogany table.  To her left sat the Deputy Chief of Mission—often referred to as 
“Chargé d’Affaires” or simply Chargé. The U.S. Embassy Abuja broadcast a live video 
feed to telecommunicate with the consulate in Lagos. Around the table sat the lead public 
affairs, regional affairs, and regional security officers, the general service, financial 
service, and political-military officers, the defense attaché, a U.S. Agency for 
International Development representative, the office of security cooperation chief and the 
special operations command and control element (SOCCE) officer.  The individuals 
around this table were seasoned professionals in their 40s and 50s, each fulfilling a multi-
year tour in Nigeria—all except for the SOCCE Commander, who sat at the table for the 
first time since entering the country.  Filling in as the Embassy’s Country Team’s Special 
Operations representative, the young officer on temporary orders was approximately five 
pay grades below and 15 years younger than his peers, with limited training and 
knowledge on the diplomatic processes and interagency environment. This was not a 
typical SEAL mission.     
Prior to his deployment to Nigeria, the SOCCE Commander completed an 18-
month work-up cycle, which prepared his SEAL Troop to prosecute missions ranging 
from combat diving, jungle warfare, long range reconnaissance patrols, ambushing 
enemy forces, boarding ships seized by pirates in rough seas, and urban combat.1 Sitting 
at a table with veteran Foreign Service Officers headed by the U.S. Ambassador—voice 
of the U.S. President in-country and four star general equivalent—the SEAL lieutenant 
was far removed from his normal work environment. Language in the teleconference 
room centered on missions that discussed peaceful engagements rather than the kinetic 
prosecution of war, such as leading troops in direct action raids with snipers in overwatch 
                                                 
1 Combat diving: placing limpet mines under ships using stealth infiltration.  Jungle warfare: surviving 
in a jungle.  Urban combat: managing information surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) and close air support 
assets while leading troops to an assault at a village compound.  
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positions and reducing enemy compounds with precision-guided bombs. Prior to the 
ambassador’s meeting, the Deputy Defense Attaché passed the SEAL a note across the 
table that read, “Whatever you do, DO NOT mention the words ‘ODA’ (Operational 
Detachment Alpha/SF Team), I will explain afterward.” Folding the paper into a four 
square and slipping it subtly under his briefing notes, the SEAL officer sat in silence, 
unassuming yet curious.  He speculated how to best craft his narrative in order to avoid 
upsetting the ambassador his first day on the job. 
The conversation went from the ambassador’s next ribbon cutting for a newly 
tapped water well by the civil affairs teams; then it moved to the Public Affairs office’s 
progress on the draft of her address at a new school in a remote village. It segued in to 
security threats against the embassy, to upcoming congressional delegation visits, to 
systemic problems with country visa authorizations, and then to the details on the next 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) project.  The discussion was out 
of the normal working context to the SEAL, who had spent his career training for war 
and had multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years. The conversation 
never diverted to ISR asset allocation windows or a target’s “pattern of life.”2  No 
intelligence officers stood up to give PowerPoint presentations on the location of a high-
value terrorist to aid the planning of a capture/kill mission. The SOCCE quickly learned 
that language discussing kinetic operations was not to be used around the embassy.  It 
had no application and, in fact, it was he, not the discussion, which was out of context.   
This case illustrates the disparity in the job a SEAL is trained for and what he is 
expected to do in irregular warfare (IW).3  To combat this gap, USSOCOM has published 
the 3-D Initiative.   
B. USSOCOM’S 3-D INITIATIVE  
In November 2009, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) released 
its first ever long-range strategy and implementation plan.  Although it does address 
                                                 
2 Information surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) is commonly used in referencing the assets used 
for tracking terrorists and understanding their pattern of life (daily routines). 
3 Throughout the duration of this thesis, the term “irregular warfare” is characterized as the violent 
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. 
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resources and the need to continually improve Special Operations Force’s (SOF) fighting 
position in the war against Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, the primary focus 
centers on the operator: the human.4  The USSOCOM 2010 strategy reflects that military 
theory has shifted from quantity of hardware to the quality of the human.  The strategy 
assumes that the greatest platform for defeating terrorist networks is humans.  It requires 
developing its people—in this case operators—to more effectively leverage defense 
capabilities through social intercourse (diplomacy) and prepare the strategic environment 
through development.  According to USSOCOM, “This whole-of-government, and 
potentially whole-of-nation, concept can best be articulated by considering the 
interrelationship and interaction of Defense, Diplomacy and Development: the ‘3-Ds.’”5 
The concept emphasizes taking a more integrated and collaborative approach to fusing 
national power elements towards U.S. national security.  The strategy characterizes the 
operator as the three dimensional (3-D) medium who will “fulfill the myriad defense, 
diplomatic, and development roles required in whole-of-government approaches, while 
maintaining an unparalleled capability to employ direct action when necessary.”6   
 
Figure 1.   Graphical Portrayal of 3-D Construct 
                                                 
4 The general term “operator” will be used in this thesis to identify the special operations operator: the 
individual on the ground executing the mission. 
5 U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010 (USSOCOM Strategy) (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 
2009), 8. 
6 USSOCOM Strategic Plan, 5, 8.  A “whole-of-government” approach refers to all entities of U.S. 
national power collaborating to resolve a problem. 
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The following sections describe how the 2010 USSOCOM strategy defines each 
“D” and how we associate them to Naval Special Warfare (NSW). Below, we unpack 
each of the three D concepts to understand them clearly before using them to guide our 
search for the NSW 3-D operator. 
1. Defense  
“In the realm of Defense, the 3-D operator understands regional and local 
interests, and builds long term trust in support of diplomatic efforts.”7  Post 9-11 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate a robust NSW capacity to perform within the 
parameters of the “defense” dimension of USSOCOM’s 3-D operator concept.  For 
example, missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) eventually transitioned from 
unilateral to bilateral through the inclusion of Iraqi security forces.  This transition forced 
SEAL Special Operation Task Forces (SOTFs) to achieve success “by, with, and 
through” host nations units, successes largely predicated on NSW’s ability to understand 
sensitive, non-secular disparities at the regional level as well as political lobbies for 
power at the local level.  Results from NSW “defensive” efforts were largely evident in 
Al Anbar, Iraq during “The Awakening,” a period from 2006 to 2007 when local citizens 
and Iraqi Defense Forces collaborated in order to successfully reclaim their 
neighborhoods from a growing insurgency.  Coalition victories during the Awakening 
showcased NSW’s “defensive” aptitude, but as the conflict seasoned, so did the 
requirements for victory.  “Defensive” efforts alone would not be enough.  
2. Diplomacy 
According to the USSOCOM Strategic Plan, “In the realm of Diplomacy, the 3-D 
Operator integrates assistance activities with broader interagency and international 
efforts.”8  As the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq matured, NSW units became 
increasingly interwoven with the interagency and adjacent combat partners to achieve 
greater efficacy in the full range of military operations (ROMO).  This focus centered on 
                                                 
7  USSOCOM Strategic Plan, 5. 
8 Ibid. 
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engendering relationships, which is the “diplomatic” dimension of the 3-D operator.  
These operations, which included rebuilding Iraqi security forces (vice unilaterally 
engaging the enemy), were also conducted successfully.  However, unlike defense and 
diplomacy, “development,” remains an area of expertise that NSW must focus on to build 
a greater capacity and more completely fulfill all three conditions of the 3-D operator.  
3. Development 
In the realm of Development, the 3-D operator brings unique skill sets 
addressing both direct and indirect means.  Direct means include those 
capabilities that aggressively counter adversaries.  Indirect means include 
those capabilities for building partner capacity and establishing long term 
relationships.9   
While NSW has shown a healthy capacity for direct means, a delivery mechanism 
that is properly trained and dedicated solely to capacity building has only recently been 
established within NSW.  The Naval Special Warfare Anchor Detachments (NSWADs) 
under the Special Activity Teams (SA-1/SA-2) are NSW’s partner capacity builders.  
Their training provides a force that understands and utilizes the indirect tools necessary to 
achieve victory in irregular warfare.  The NSWADs are discussed at greater length in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis. 
The 3-Ds embody the current way of war for the United States government 
(USG).  The so-called long war, also commonly referred to as “Overseas Contingency 
Operations,” is not like the World Wars on which our military is based, where victory is 
achieved by subjugating the enemy with overwhelming firepower.10  
The Strategic Plan’s Focus Area 1: The Operator, Implementation Task 1.1 is the 
section that pertains to this thesis.  It guides NSW to, “Build mechanisms to effectively 
mesh DOD irregular warfare activities with the diplomatic and development efforts of 
interagency partners, especially at country team level.”11  The adversaries facing the 
                                                 
9 USSOCOM Strategic Plan, 5. 
10 The Obama Administration has replaced the “global war on terror” (GWOT) terminology with the 
term long war, sometimes called “overseas contingency operations,” to describe the ongoing war against Al 
Qaeda and violent extremist groups. 
11 USSOCOM Strategic Plan, 8. 
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United States and its allies today are predominantly groups or networks of individuals 
rather than nation states or conventional militaries.  Given the irregular nature of this 
conflict, U.S. and allied forces have to step outside the construct of conventional military 
wisdom on how to prosecute war. Combined bombing offensives, mechanized infantry 
battalions, and nuclear powered aircraft carriers that rely on a systematic approach to 
optimize overwhelming force (i.e., the Napoleonic style of warfare) are not appropriate 
means in the struggle against Al Qaeda and global extremists.  The effort is now focused 
on the social intercourse of war—the gray area—in which the causal pathway to victory 
is uncertain. 
C. TRADEOFFS 
Training a lethal force, such as Navy SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Operators), to be 
more effective at diplomacy and development will come with a cost: the trade-off 
between bolstering irregular capability at the expense of surgical lethality.  Adjustments 
in training will need to be made to prepare the operator with, most importantly, the 
mindset of being able to conduct surgical raids in urban terrain as well as briefing a U.S. 
ambassador on building a host nation SOF capability while wearing a suit and tie.  The 
Focus Areas of USSOCOM’s Strategic Plan (separate document implementing the 
Strategy) “outline what SOF needs to do differently, not what it needs to do every day.”12  
Our goal is to determine how to improve training to better prepare Naval Special Warfare 
(NSW) operators for positions that require competence in dealing with the interagency 
process.  The intent of this thesis is to assist NSW leadership in defining what the 3-D 
team, training, and mission looks like for an operator.  In short, how does NSW answer 




                                                 
12 The plan is separate document and is the “plan” on how to implement the strategy. USSOCOM 
Strategic Plan, 7. 
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After defining the 3-Ds and the irregular warfare mission, the next section gives 
the reader the theoretical framework we use to deconstruct NSW as an organization.   
D. THE NSW ORGANIZATION: OUR APPLIED THEORY 
NSW has a rich history of adapting to the environment in order to stay relevant.  
It undoubtedly will have to change again to prepare its operators to stay relevant in the 
irregular warfare mission of meeting the needs of the 3-D Construct.  The idea of an 
organization that is adapted to its environment in order to survive and accomplish its 
missions is addressed by organizational contingency theory.  We apply it to analyze NSW 
and discern how it needs to change.  “The essence of the contingency theory paradigm is 
that organizational effectiveness results from fitting characteristics of the organization… 
to contingencies that reflect the situation of the organization.”13  This theory provides a 
framework to show how organizations adapt their internal characteristics (i.e., structure, 
tasks, people and culture) to meet the challenges posed by their operating environments.  
When an organization’s internal characteristics are aligned with each other environmental 
influences (e.g., stakeholders, the market, types of conflict) the organization is said to be 
in “fit.”  If NSW is to fight an irregular enemy and espouse the 3-D operator initiative, 
contingency theory dictates that it will have to adapt its structure, training, people and 
culture to fight in an irregular environment. 
E. ROAD MAP  
USSOCOM’s 3-D construct calls for an eclectic mix of skills to effectively 
combat enemies within the irregular warfare arena.  Again, the goal of this thesis is to 
provide NSW leadership with potential solutions to accurately define the team, training 
and mission of the 3-D operator.  In Chapter I, we described the environment of an 
Embassy Country Team in Nigeria to illustrate why operators from traditional SEAL 
Troops—who train predominantly for the kinetic mission set—will have a difficult time 
adapting to the risk averse culture of an Embassy.  This sets the stage for why NSW is 
faced with the tremendous organizational challenge of filling this non-traditional mission 
                                                 
13 Lex Donaldson, The Contingency Theory of Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2001), 1.  
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with properly trained personnel.  We introduced USSOCOM’s 3-D initiative, defined the 
3-Ds in how they pertain to NSW, and presented our research question.  We then 
introduced organizational contingency theory as a means to deconstruct NSW and offer 
solutions to the leadership on how to be better prepared for irregular warfare.  
In Chapter II, we diagnose the current state of NSW by using organizational 
contingency theory to analyze how a SEAL team is organized and designed to combat 
U.S. adversaries.  The larger environment depends on the strategic guidance set forth by 
national civilian and military leadership and discusses environmental factors that directly 
or indirectly affect the NSW organization.  This section also uses the NSW internal 
characteristics of structure, tasks, people, and culture to illustrate how a SEAL team, 
specifically a troop, functions.  Here it is important to note that we emphasize human 
resources processes and structure: the ways and means by which NSW trains people to do 
the work.  Lastly, it describes the SEAL culture and how it can affect the function of an 
organization.  At the conclusion of this chapter, the underlying question in terms of 
organizational “fit” remains:  Is the traditional SEAL Team Inter Deployment Training 
Cycle (IDTC) adequate for preparing NSW operators for 3-D environments?  
In Chapter III, we analyze a former Special Operations Command and Control 
Element (SOCCE) on the U.S. Embassy Country Team in Nigeria.  We use this case to 
demonstrate the notion of the 3-D Construct, SOF/interagency integration, and how 
current SEAL team training mentioned in Chapter II is inadequate to prepare operators to 
take on these types of 3-D roles.  The SOCCE is one of the key models for developing 
and institutionalizing NSW 3-D capabilities in order to be effective in conducting the 
irregular warfare mission.  The chapter illustrates how this small SOF team was an 
anomaly.  Despite being under-prepared for this type of 3-D mission, the team was able 
to establish a Nigerian counterterrorism unit and overcome significant diplomatic 
obstacles.  The case shows how a small SOF team inserted into a key country embassy 
can have a positive impact on countering the growing threat of transnational terrorism 
through host nation capacity building. However, the mission lacks continuity due to the 
frequent turnover of SOF teams cycling through short duration deployments, and 
essential relationships with permanent country team members become fragmented. The 
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U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Special Operations Command Africa 
(SOCAFRICA) strategies place a heavy emphasis on “by, with and through” with 
interagency and partner nations to promote regional stability, combat terrorism and 
advance U.S. strategic objectives. A change will need to come in how these missions are 
resourced with SOF personnel in order to achieve long-term results. 
Chapter IV provides an overview and analysis of NSW’s “Anchor Detachments,” 
or NSWADs, which are regionally-focused SOF units.  They are NSW’s solution to 
operating in the irregular warfare paradigm by integrating with the interagency to meet 
national objectives.  We argue that the NSWAD operators, and not traditional SEAL 
team operators, are a better fit for staffing missions such as SOCCE Nigeria because they 
have the appropriate interagency and regional training.  Specifically we argue that 
NSWADs are the long-term solution to USSOCOM’s 3-D operator.  
However, short-term success will be difficult given the cultural gap that exists 
between traditional NSW training focus and that of the new NSWADs.  The 2010 
USSOCOM Strategy and NSWADs Tasking Order are used to define and review the 
need for a 3-D operator.  Environmental contingencies affecting NSW’s internal 
processes are addressed in order to demonstrate the need to initiate the NSWADs 
program as well as indicate how NSW culture will be problematic to overcome.  The next 
section analyzes the NSWADs composition and application in the long war.  Specifically, 
training and focus are compared to point out the dramatic differences in the goals of 
traditional NSW units and those of NSWADs.  
Organizational contingency theory is again used to point out that, until recently, 
NSW generally formulated metrics of success based on kinetic environmental inputs.  
However, the NSWAD initiative is based on irregular contingencies from the 
environment and is the reason for one of the shifts in both structure and focus for NSW.  
Finally, it discusses NSW people and culture, which the SEAL operator embodies.  NSW 
has spent years cultivating a culture steeped in a direct and aggressive mindset in its 
approach to combating the enemy.  Successful implementation of NSWADs indirect 
culture via NSW will require a severe shift.  Over the long term, that shift will require 
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cultivation time in order to produce the kind of success NSW is used to seeing in its 
mission sets.  In the short term, it will be very difficult to build an indirect culture with 
operators from the kinetic based culture. 
Finally, in Chapter V, we summarize the thesis with the main conclusions of each 
chapter and offer recommendations to improve NSW training in order to carry out 
USSOCOM’s 3-D vision.  We look at implementing 3-D capabilities from a training, 
organizational and human resources/personnel standpoint.  Ultimately, we found that 
NSWADs were the best fit for the 3-D environment and recommended NSWAD manning 
and incentives to be improved. 
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II. A DIAGNOSIS OF NSW 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTINGENCY THEORY: ITS APPLICATION 
TO NSW 
Organizational contingency theory is a useful tool to diagnose and analyze NSW 
because the NSW organization has historically exemplified the need to adapt to a 
changing environment.  “Navy special warfare units have a history of boom and bust: 
rapid buildup during World War II and Vietnam and near elimination following each of 
these conflicts.”14  From the Scouts and Raiders, to the Naval Combat Demolition Units 
(NCDUs), to the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), to what we now call SEAL 
teams, NSW has battled the military bureaucracy to survive.  After WWII, senior 
conventional navy leaders found little value in the European and Pacific Theater of 
operations style of UDT tactics.15  Fortunately for naval special operations, President 
John F. Kennedy took great interest in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency 
capability; naval special warfare revived when he created the first SEAL teams in 1962.  
Despite the many successes SEALs enjoyed during Vietnam as an inland and riverine 
guerrilla force, they nearly became extinct as U.S. national security strategy shifted focus 
to “World War III and the cold war conflict.”16  Senior SEAL leadership was again 
forced to prove that SEALs were still a relevant force.  NSW officers successfully argued 
that SEALs were capable of conducting high-impact, kinetic missions that would be 
necessary in the cold war era.17  SEAL leadership had survived decades of instability and 
found job security.  In the mid-1980s, USSOCOM was officially established and became 
the umbrella for all Special Operations Forces.  
                                                 
14 Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1997), 21. 
15 Ibid., 25. 
16 Marquis adds on page 65 from an interview with Captain Ron Yeaw in February of 1994, “…The 
disorientation and isolation of the SEALs after Vietnam is revealed by the only member of SEAL Team 2 
who served three tours in Vietnam, ‘The SEALs were really grasping for something to do….We came back 
from Vietnam….All of a sudden our reason for being [was gone]….After about six months [in the United 
States], you were ready to go do something again.  And there wasn’t anything available.  There was nothing 
playing.  What [were] we going to train for?...The only thinking had been-get ready for Vietnam. [Now] no 
mission.’”  
17 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 67. 
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Organizational contingency theory is used to frame our analysis and show how 
the NSW organization is currently not designed for the irregular warfare mission because 
its structures and processes train the operator almost exclusively for the kinetic mission 
set.  By viewing the organization through the lens of “fitness,” NSW can more effectively 
adjust its internal processes to the security challenges in today’s environment.18  To 
better understand the NSW organization, this chapter introduces key concepts of an open 
system and follows with a discussion relating these concepts to the major components 
and functions of a SEAL team.  
B. THE OPEN SYSTEM 
One of the key insights underpinning organizational theory and design is that 
organizations are open systems.  Hannah describes open systems as those that “are 
dependent on their external environment in order to survive and are, therefore, open to 
influences and transactions with the outside world as long as they exist.”19.  Figure 2 
graphically illustrates the open system model that we use to frame our analysis.20  In 
short, the environment affects the internal processes of the organization, which then 
affects the organization’s output.  This chapter uses this model as a guide to diagnose and 
discuss the NSW organization.   
                                                 
18 David P. Hanna, “Understanding how Organizations Function,” in Designing Organizations for 
High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1988), 3. 
19 Ibid., 8. 
20 Structure, tasks, and culture are all elements that represent how an organization functions internally. 
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Figure 2.   Open System Model21 
C. THE NSW ENVIRONMENT 
The NSW environment is defined as all elements outside the NSW organizational 
boundary that affects its ability to function.  The major environmental sectors that affect 
NSW are the stakeholders in superior positions (e.g., chain of command) and the 
competition with other military units to reserve training sites and attend qualification 
schools.  Figure 3 portrays the influence of NSW environmental sectors on the NSW 
organization. 
 
Figure 3.   The NSW Environment and Organization 
1. Geographic Combatant Commands   
The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) are unified commands that have a 
responsibility to a specific area in the world.  The document that explains the GCCs and 
                                                 
21 Modified framework using the Galbraith, McCaskey, Leavett, and Roberts systems model. 
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their responsibilities is the unified command plan (UCP).  The UCP “establishes the 
missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands and establishes 
their general geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) and functions.”22  Out of the 10 
combatant commands delineated by the UCP, the Geographic Combatant Commanders 
(GCCs) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) exert the greatest amount 
of influence on NSW.23  GCCs depend on NSW assets and skill-sets in their respective 
AORs to conduct a range of military operations in support of regional efforts.  These 
GCCs are able to mandate the receipt of NSW assets via the deployment orders that are 
directed by the National Command Authority.24  Figure 4 shows how the world is divided 
into separate GCC areas of responsibility. 
 
Figure 4.   Unified Command Map25 
                                                 
22 White House, The Unified Command Plan (Unclassified) (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 1. 
23 Unified commands established by National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code are 
U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, 
U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation 
Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.  GCCs are Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) that have an assigned AOR.  COCOMs that have trans-regional responsibilities are functional 
combatant commanders.  
24 U.S. Department of the Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1001.24 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Navy, 2000), 3. 
25 U.S. Department of Defense, “DefenseLINK-Unified Command Plan,” United States Department of 
Defense, http://www.defense.gov/specials/unifiedcommand/ (accessed June 14 2010). 
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The variance in sources of conflict in these vast regions is high.  Currently, the 
preponderance of NSW forces deploy to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.  These 
regions have diverse terrains, cultures, languages, ethnicities, religious affiliations, types 
of government, security capabilities, and sources of conflict.  This presents a highly 
complex and unstable environment when so many factors persist that have the potential 
to escalate to violent conflict within a short period.  GCCs expect and must rely on NSW 
units to understand the complexities and historical context within their respective AORs 
in order to be successful in conducting military operations.    
2. USSOCOM   
USSOCOM is a functional command charged with the responsibility of providing 
specially trained and equipped Special Operations Forces (SOF) ready to conduct Special 
Operations (SO) in support of GCC objectives in the region. NSW is the Navy SOF 
component under USSOCOM’s chain of command; it receives all of its funding for 
training, equipping, and deploying Operators from USSOCOM to support the GCC 
objectives.  
USSOCOM is a force provider, which means it must meet the needs of the 
environment (requirements of GCCs) by supplying operators who are ready to confront 
the challenges posed by environments overseas.  In order to successfully meet the needs 
of the environment, USSOCOM publishes a strategy, which is a “plan for interacting 
with the competitive environment to achieve organizational goals.”26  As introduced in 
Chapter I, this strategy is to align SOF operators with the “3-D” Construct in order to 
successfully deter, defeat, or prevent violence in an environment characterized by 
irregular warfare and asymmetric challenges.27  Specifically, USSOCOM directs NSW to 
be able to conduct several missions to achieve these ends.  On NSW’s unclassified 
webpage, brief descriptions of missions tasked to SEAL operators are listed: 
 
                                                 
26 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Oklahoma City, OK: South-
Western Publishing Co, 2003), 20. 
27 USSOCOM Strategic Plan.  
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A tactical force with strategic impact, NSW mission areas include 
unconventional warfare, direct action, combating terrorism, special 
reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, information warfare, security 
assistance, counter-drug operations, personnel recovery and hydrographic 
reconnaissance. Although NSW personnel comprise less than one percent 
of U.S. Navy personnel, they offer big dividends on a small investment.28 
As a result of the environment, NSW has a set of ten disparate missions that the 
traditional operating unit, a troop, must be prepared to conduct.  Becoming competent to 
perform at a high standard in all of these missions in different environments of the GCCs, 
is an extremely arduous, time-consuming task.   
3. Training Schedules 
NSW has a reactive or crisis management style of scheduling training because 
new commitments around the globe and competition for resources are constantly 
affecting scheduling efforts.  This method of scheduling does not facilitate the training 
required for kinetic mission sets, let alone irregular missions.  NSW attempts to fill a 
finite amount of time with kinetic training blocks to maintain its core competency, and 
yet full training cycles are rarely completed.  Training cycles are rarely completed 
because many schools and training sites are outside of NSW control.  For example, naval 
leadership is a required school for promotion by the Navy, which falls outside of NSW’s 
purview.  Another example is the NSW requirement to deploy with a certain number of 
freefall jumpmasters; however, the only school in the military that can qualify a freefall 
jumpmaster is run by the U.S. Army.  NSW troops rarely have the priority at training 
installations such as Ft. Knox, Kentucky or Ft. Hood, Texas simply because conventional 
Army units own the training sites. Scheduling conflicts that arise within a replete training 
cycle cause further problems that often result in cancellations.  Adding irregular training 
to the schedule, which is already at the mercy of other military units, presents a bleak 
outlook.   
These sectors in the NSW environment, however, are only part of the larger 
environment that affects NSW.    
                                                 
28  Naval Special Warfare Command, “Official U.S. Navy SEAL Home Page,” Naval Special Warfare 
Command, http://www.navsoc.navy.mil/missions.htm (accessed June 14, 2010). 
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D. THE LARGER ENVIRONMENT 
The larger environment consists of sectors that are outside the control of NSW’s 
chain of command and the U.S. military in general but still affect NSW, often indirectly.  
Contingency theory describes environments in terms of stability, which is the “rate of 
change of elements over time,” and complexity, which is “the number and dissimilarity 
of external elements relevant to an organization’s operation.”  We argue that the NSW 
organization exists within a highly complex and highly unstable environment.29  The 
sectors mentioned in this section were taken from the common themes of recent U.S. 
strategic guidance.30 These sectors of the environment are not intended to provide a 
detailed analysis of their individual effect; they are meant to provide a general overview 
of environmental contingencies relevant to NSW and how they collectively present an 
unstable and complex environment.  Figure 5 shows the larger environment as another 
layer that influences the NSW environment and ultimately the NSW organization. 
 
Figure 5.   The Larger Environment and NSW 
                                                 
29 . Naval Special Warfare Command, “Official U.S. Navy SEAL Home Page;” Daft, Essentials of 
Organization Theory and Design, 58. 
30 U.S. strategic guidance is the collection of security strategy publications from the White House, 
Department of Defense, and the U.S. military.  In addition, U.S. maritime strategy and USSOCOM’s 
strategy were used. 
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1. Globalization 
Globalization is a vast topic that we can only briefly introduce as it pertains to our 
topic.  Thomas Friedman defines globalization as “connecting all the knowledge centers 
on the planet into a single global network.”31 Globalization has both beneficial and 
damaging effects on the NSW organization.  NSW’s ability to exploit technology to 
improve its global reach in combating irregular enemies is an effect that benefits NSW.  
However, enemies of the United States are also able to leverage technology as a medium 
to flatten the playing field.  Friedman elaborates on globalization:  
…if politics and terrorism do not get in the way—[globalization] could 
usher in an amazing era of prosperity, innovation, and collaboration, by 
companies, communities, and individuals.  But contemplating the flat 
world also left me filled with dread, professional and personal.  My 
personal dread derived from the obvious fact that it’s not only the software 
writers and computer geeks who get empowered to collaborate on work in 
a flat world.  It’s also al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks.  The playing 
field is not being leveled only in ways that draw in and superempower a 
whole new group of innovators.  It’s being leveled in a way that draws in 
and superempowers a whole new group of angry, frustrated, and 
humiliated men and women.32 
The military also recognizes globalization’s potential benefits and pitfalls.  
According to the National Defense Strategy, globalization can “create a web of 
interrelated vulnerabilities and spread risks even further, increasing sensitivity to crises 
and shocks around the globe and generating more uncertainty regarding their speed and 
effect.”33  The dynamic complexity of globalization illustrated by this quote drives the 
need for the NSW organization to decentralize in order to combat irregular enemies. 
                                                 
31 Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 8. 
32  Ibid. 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2008), 4–5, U.S. Department of Defense, 
www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf (accessed June 14 2010)  
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2. Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare 
The 2008 National Defense Strategy and 2010 USSOCOM strategy reference a 
capability requirement to combat traditional adversaries in case future security challenges 
present a conventional warfare environment.34  While this traditional capability needs to 
be maintained, it is evident that irregular challenges seen today pose the greatest threat to 
U.S. national security.  Not only is irregular warfare a more accurate description of 
today’s type of conflict, it is an extremely complex style of warfare far removed from 
waging a war of attrition.  IW is a more accurate description of today’s conflict because it 
“manifests itself as one or a combination of several possible forms including insurgency, 
terrorism, disinformation, propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug 
trafficking).”35  This style of warfare requires a more comprehensive approach than 
traditional NSW missions of direct action and special reconnaissance.  
3. Violent Extremism 
The National Defense Strategy notes, “…for the foreseeable future, this 
environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that 
seeks to overturn the international state system.”36 Specifically, the violent extremist 
ideologies of non-state actors are a verifiable threat because they are empowered by 
modern technology to achieve global effects as seen by the World Trade Center attacks 
on September 11, 2001.  The 9/11 attacks initiated one of the greatest struggles against 
violent extremism, which continues that after ten years.     
4. Socio-Cultural 
The landscape portraying the types of societies, cultures, demographics, and 
politics from one area of the world is vastly different from another.  This presents a very 
                                                 
34 Fighting traditional adversaries typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military 
operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in 
the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment (which includes 
cyberspace). 
35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Strategic Context,” in Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Change 2) 1–
6. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001. Joint Electronic Library. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ 
(accessed June 14, 2010). 
36 U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2. 
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difficult problem set for military units because it is difficult to become a regional expert 
while maintaining core military skill sets.  As the White House promulgated, “Profound 
cultural and demographic tensions, rising demand for resources, and rapid urbanization 
could reshape single countries and entire regions.”37  In other words, various regions of 
the world are increasingly vulnerable to abrupt changes in socio-cultural landscapes.  
Current U.S. maritime strategy acknowledges the existence of instability; however, it is 
unclear to what degree the U.S. military, in general, realizes the significant implications 
in terms of organizational challenges that instability presents.38  
5. Economic 
As world economies develop and populations grow, competition increases for 
resources.  This competition in a world dependent on resources (e.g., fossil fuels) creates 
a situation ripe with conflict.39  Increasing resource demand, consumption, and scarcity 
are premises for conflict, especially when resources are finite (e.g. arable land).  The 
above mentioned factors “coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider 
claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—
potentially resulting in conflict.”40 
6. International 
The international environment encompasses nation-states, variance in government 
types, and interaction between governments and non-government entities.  The U.S. 
military will always be concerned with powerful nation-states (e.g., Russia, China, Iran) 
and their conventional military might, but now various types of governments and non-
government organizations must be given equal consideration.  As stated in the current 
U.S. maritime strategy titled, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 
“Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, 
                                                 
37 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 8. 
38 U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2007), U. S. Navy, www.navy.mil/maritime/maritimestrategy.pdf (accessed June 14, 2010).  
39 White House, National Security Strategy, 8. 
40 U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy. 
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and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these 
emerging threats.”41  The international sector of the larger environment is important to 
understand because the methods used by different governments and their stakeholders to 
meet the needs and expectations of their populations differ.  If the stakeholder needs are 
not being met, conditions may exist for a society to replace a government with one that is 
more capable.42 
7. Human Resources 
Human resources, as they pertain to NSW, are the inputs it receives from the 
larger environment.  Specifically, these inputs are individual human beings.  Civilians 
enlisting to pursue careers as SEALs have a direct effect on the health of the NSW 
organization.  NSW dependence on people raises two significant issues.  The first issue is 
recruiting and selecting the appropriate people.  The second issue is the number of people 
needed to become SEALs and populate the force.   
These issues have become problematic because NSW forces are feeling the 
effects of difficult training, deployments, and continuous combat operations since the 
GWOT began in 2001.  Numerous SEALs have died, been wounded, and generally feel 
exhausted.  The annual number of SEALs retiring or separating from the service 
compounds the problem of replenishing the increased demand.  In order to re-populate 
SEAL manpower, the NSW community must pull from the larger environment to 
replenish its forces. 
The influences of the larger NSW environments pose a great challenge to the 
NSW organization and its ability to successfully operate in a highly unstable and 
complex environment.  The next step is to take a look at how NSW is organized to 
interact within such an environment.  The structure, tasks, people, and culture of the 
SEAL teams is an important part of the open system framework that will further 
understanding of NSW. 
                                                 
41 U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy. 
42 USSOCOM Strategic Plan, 3. 
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E. NSW STRUCTURE AND TASKS 
A basic description that states how Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NAVSPECWARCOM) is generally organized and structured is provided by the NSW 
homepage: 
The major operational components of Naval Special Warfare Command 
include Naval Special Warfare Groups ONE and THREE in San Diego, 
CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups TWO and FOUR in Norfolk, VA. 
These components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, 
and Special Boat Teams worldwide to meet the training, exercise, 
contingency and wartime requirements of theater commanders. 
With approximately 5,400 total active-duty personnel--including 2,450 
SEALs and 600 Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC)--
NSW forces are busier than ever answering “911 calls” from around the 
globe. NSW also calls on a 1,200-person reserve of approximately 325 
SEALs, 125 SWCC and 775 support personnel.43 
Figure 6 illustrates a more detailed task organization model of NSW: 
 
Figure 6.   The NSW Task Organization Model 
                                                 
43 Naval Special Warfare Command, “Naval Special Warfare Small Investment, Big Real-World 
Dividends. Committed to Combating Global Terrorist Threats,” Naval Special Warfare Command, 
http://www.navsoc.navy.mil/default.htm (accessed June 14, 2010). 
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The major components highlighted in Figure 6 are the four NSW groups (NSWG-
1/2/3/4).  These are major commands responsible for training, equipping, and funding 
SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen (SWCC); these functions provide 
GCCs the maritime arm of SOF.  A brief description of all components of NSW can be 
found in Appendix A, but NSWG-1 and NSWG-2 have the preponderance of the SEAL 
force and will be the focus of this thesis from this point forward. 
Within each NSWG, four SEAL teams exist that consist of three SEAL troops.  
 
Figure 7.   SEAL Team Operator Task Organization 
At any given time, approximately 100 SEAL Operators exist within the SEAL 
Team.  The difference between SEAL Operators and the senior leadership, usually filling 
the executive positions, is equivalent to different roles of the players of a sports team and 
their coaches.  The operators are the practitioners of their leadership’s strategy.  The 
SEAL operator is the backbone of the NSW force responsible for executing the tactical 
aspect of special operations overseas, meeting the capricious challenges of the 
environment. 
To prepare for combat deployment, a SEAL troop is formed at the beginning of 
what is called the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC).  This IDTC is broken up 
into three, six-month phases designed to complete several tasks that ultimately deem a 
troop ready to deploy.  The military refers to these tasks as mission essential task lists 
(METLs) and describes them as “an action or activity (derived from an analysis of the 
mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual or organization to provide a 
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capability.”44  NSW METLs fall within a broader military system of universal joint task 
lists (UJTLs) designed to drive the way in which forces train to accomplish a given 
mission.45 NSW METLs accomplished during IDTC, such as long-range vehicle 
navigation, fast roping from helicopters, and close quarters combat, largely support 
special reconnaissance and direct action missions.  These METLs are the heart of SEAL 
combat readiness, and they are essential to developing the troop’s ability to succeed in 
kinetic mission sets while on deployment. 
The first phase of IDTC, professional development (PRODEV), is the time and 
funding allotted for individual SEALs to attend a variety of qualification courses or 
schools.  This phase is first because the troop depends on individual specialties as it 
progresses toward the next phase.  This high degree of specialization serves the troop’s 
best interest as individuals can focus on single skill sets and become the platoon’s subject 
matter expert in a given field (e.g., radio communication or sniper operations).  This 
portion of training is the genesis for standardization of skills and the decentralization that 
the SEAL community prides itself on.46  A sample of schools is listed in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
44 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task Manual, CJCSM 3500.04e (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008), A-4, DTIC online, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsm3500_04e.pdf (accessed 
June 14, 2010). 
45 See Appendix B of this thesis for more detail. 
46 Hanna, Understanding how Organizations Function, 198. 
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Table 1.   Sample of Requisite Schools 
• Sniper School: Thirteen week course designed to teach long range photography, 
digital manipulation of photographs (Adobe Photoshop), transmit photos via 
satellite with field radio; how to stalk a target (Urban, Mountain/Desert, Jungle), 
isolate and contain, send back reports to Command and Control element; and 
become an expert in long-range target interdiction—500meters and beyond with 
high powered, multi-caliber rifles. 
• Breacher: Operators becomes experts in demolition with plastic explosives, 
chainsaws, “quickie-saws,” opening tools. 
• Advanced Special Operations: Preparation of the environment. 
• Languages: Operators go through language immersion programs.  They are 
provided all the material to maintain proficiency when deployed.   
• Outboard Motors (OBM): Learn how to fix outboard motors that power small 
rubber boats, or Combat Rubber Raiding Craft, used as an infiltration platform. 
• Hazardous Material (HAZMAT): Transport all hazard material (demo, ordnance, 
fluids) over land/air. 
 
• Static Line Jump Master/Free Fall Jump Master: Army schools that qualify 
personnel to be in charge of static or free fall jump evolutions. 
• Load Master: Learn rules/regulations to package all cargo/equipment on 
military aircraft. 
• High Speed and Off Road 4x4 Driving: Specialized training designed to give 
driving experience in hazardous terrain and 4x4 vehicle capability.  
 
In the second phase, unit level training, the entire troop physically works and 
trains together.  This phase gives troops the opportunity to train as a unit in various 
kinetically focused mission profiles in both land and water environments.  This is also the 
first time troop leaders are able to evaluate personnel and assess any equipment shortfalls 
that need to be addressed prior to deployment.  A brief outline of a generic ULT schedule 
is in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Generic ULT Schedule 
• Rifle/Marksmanship:  One week of troop sighting in weapons at ranges  
• Close Quarters Combat (CQC): Advanced weapons tactics—two weeks in 
Mississippi 
• Special Operations Urban Combat (SOUC): Three weeks of mission 
planning and execution of direct action missions (squad, platoon, troop size) 
on urban structures in Indiana; follow-on training from CQC. 
• Land Warfare: Five weeks of two man-squad-platoon-troop size Immediate 
Action Drills (IADs)—breaking contact or assaulting the enemy in a 
firefight, Land Navigation, Ambush training (Demo intensive), and finishing 
with full mission profiles using rotary wing and close air support. 
• Combat Diving: Three weeks of two-man, four-man, eight-man dive 
profiles: penetrating harbors undetected and planting inert mines/charges 
underneath ships to disable/sink them; three days of troop full mission 
profiles (FMPs) on the last week. 
• Maritime Operations (MarOps): Two weeks of navigating inter-coastal 
waterways and seas with Combat Raiding Rubber Craft (CRRC).   
• Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS): Two weeks of interdicting ships 
with high speed assault crafts in different sea states (calm/high), and gaining 
control of their movement.  FMPs are the last few days and usually consist of 
“terrorists” or “pirate” scenarios getting control of a ship and our mission is 
to neutralize the threat and/or rescue the hostages.   
• Mobility in Desert Warfare: Two weeks at Hawthorne, Nevada conducting 
long-range patrols in off-road vehicles (HMMWVs) and executing vehicle 
IADs to assault or break enemy contact. 
• Admin Weeks: Three to four weeks mixed in the training cycle one week at 
a time that give operators the chance to take care of personal business (pay 
bills, see family, decompress) after being on the road for months at a time.  
The third and final phase, Squadron Integration Training (SIT), is designed to 
make final preparations for the upcoming deployment.  Additional personnel and 
specialties, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians, logisticians, and 
administrative support are attached to the troop.  This phase is also designed to refine and 
tailor combat skills by introducing maritime and air assets.  Rather than operating solely 
as operators on the ground, SEALs are given the chance to incorporate the dynamics of 
maneuver assets.  Full mission profiles (FMPs) are conducted by the troop and graded by 
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senior enlisted and officers from the SEAL team chain of command.  This exercise forces 
the troop to perform as it would when faced with the greater complexity and realities of 
combat.  Lastly, this phase is designed to allow for SEALs and their families to spend 
ample time together prior to a six-month deployment.   
Given the framework of the IDTC, its tasks, and the troop structure, NSW as an 
organization resembles a hybrid form of a professional-machine bureaucracy.47  
Machine-like organizations rely on standardized rules and operating procedures and have 
large, elaborate administrative support staffs.  NSW is influenced by these characteristics 
because it is part of the larger military environment that seeks efficiency and reliability.  
Standardized means of execution, uniforms, a focus on how one executes work processes 
through standard training cycles, forms, and templates are all mechanistic parts of the 
NSW organization.  However, NSW is not an archetypal mechanistic organization, 
especially at the operating core.  The extensive training that SEALs endure also includes 
education to make complex judgments.  SEALs are trained to be “thinking shooters,” to 
use judgment that is more akin to the judgments required of operators in professional 
bureaucracies.  An NSW troop is a hybrid between a mechanistic and professional 
organization, both of which flourish in stable environments or environments where 
SEALs know generally what to expect.48  Figure 8 shows where this hybrid professional-
machine falls in accordance with Mintzberg’s structural configurations. 
                                                 
47 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Boston Harvard Business Review 59, no 
1, (1981): 103. 
48 Ibid., 108–110. 
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Figure 8.   Mintzberg’s Structural Themes and How NSW Aligns 
The current NSW IDTC is structured to prepare SEAL troops for conducting 
direct action missions in a kinetic environment.  NSW structure and tasks are not the only 
internal processes of the NSW organization that promote a kinetically oriented force.  
The most significant internal processes of the NSW organization are its people and 
culture.  The next section gives an overview NSW people and culture in order to give a 
human resources perspective.  
F. NSW PEOPLE AND CULTURE 
Marcoulides and Heck define organizational culture as “patterns of shared values 
and beliefs over time which produce behavioral norms that are adopted in solving 
problems.”49  The distinctive point in time that begins to establish the shared values and 
beliefs for NSW is when recruits arrive at Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) 
training in Coronado, California.  Marquis notes that students, at the onset of this 
training, quickly realize their elite status and attribute these differences to SOF values of 
independence and unconventional thinking that goes against the usual military 
characteristics of conformity, hierarchy and direct thinking.50 
                                                 
49 George A. Marcoulides and Ronald H. Heck, “Organizational Culture and Performance: Proposing 
and Testing a Model,” Organization Science 4, no. 2 (1993): 211. 
50 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, 8. 
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The SEAL culture is one that is lethally focused.  BUD/S training and all 
subsequent training consist of mission profiles that are aimed primarily at killing or 
capturing enemy personnel (e.g., direct action and special reconnaissance).  As one 
Commanding Officer of Naval Special Warfare Center stated to students the night before 
a HELL week, “this community is about killing people and breaking things.”51 
The focused lethal mindset is a constant throughout the organization.  It 
personifies the operators’ commitment and their ability to perform a diverse set of 
missions over hours of arduous training in different environments (e.g., sea, mountain, 
jungle, riverine, desert).  This is why SEALs are considered among the most diverse and 
competent SOF operators of the U.S. military.   
Military organizations or other organizations that exhibit “strong cultures,” such 
as NSW, typically publish some form of a statement to encapsulate shared norms and 
beliefs.  NSW calls this the SEAL creed. 52 
United States Navy SEALs 
In times of war or uncertainty there is a special breed of warrior ready to 
answer our Nation’s call. A common man with uncommon desire to 
succeed. Forged by adversity, he stands alongside America’s finest special 
operations forces to serve his country, the American people, and protect 
their way of life. I am that man. 
My Trident is a symbol of honor and heritage. Bestowed upon me by the 
heroes that have gone before, it embodies the trust of those I have sworn 
to protect. By wearing the Trident, I accept the responsibility of my 
chosen profession and way of life. It is a privilege that I must earn every 
day. 
My loyalty to Country and Team is beyond reproach. I humbly serve as a 
guardian to my fellow Americans always ready to defend those who are 
unable to defend themselves. I do not advertise the nature of my work, nor 
seek recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept the inherent hazards 
of my profession, placing the welfare and security of others before my 
own. 
                                                 
51 Anonymous SEAL during the week long evolution where BUD/S candidates go through endless 
training exercises/physical evolutions and receive little to no sleep. 
52 Marcoulides and Heck, “Organizational Culture and Performance,” 209. 
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I serve with honor on and off the battlefield. The ability to control my 
emotions and my actions, regardless of circumstance, sets me apart from 
other men. Uncompromising integrity is my standard. My character and 
honor are steadfast. My word is my bond. 
We expect to lead and be led. In the absence of orders I will take charge, 
lead my teammates and accomplish the mission. I lead by example in all 
situations. 
I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity. My Nation expects 
me to be physically harder and mentally stronger than my enemies. If 
knocked down, I will get back up, every time. I will draw on every 
remaining ounce of strength to protect my teammates and to accomplish 
our mission. I am never out of the fight. 
We demand discipline. We expect innovation. The lives of my teammates 
and the success of our mission depend on me - my technical skill, tactical 
proficiency, and attention to detail. My training is never complete. 
We train for war and fight to win. I stand ready to bring the full spectrum 
of combat power to bear in order to achieve my mission and the goals 
established by my country. The execution of my duties will be swift and 
violent when required yet guided by the very principles that I serve to 
defend. 
Brave men have fought and died building the proud tradition and feared 
reputation that I am bound to uphold. In the worst of conditions, the 
legacy of my teammates steadies my resolve and silently guides my every 
deed. I will not fail.”53 
Former SEAL Dick Couch attempted to characterize the culture when he stated, 
“Navy SEALs are intelligent, proud, determined, resourceful, aggressive, persistent—and 
the list goes on.”54   
G. CONCLUSION 
To reiterate, organizational contingency theory states that organizational 
effectiveness is a result of an organization’s ability to match internal processes with the 
                                                 
53 “The SEAL Creed,” Naval Special Warfare, http://www.seal.navy.mil/seal/PDF/Seal.Creed.pdf 
(accessed June 14, 2010). 
54 Dick Couch, The Finishing School: Earning the Navy SEAL Trident, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2004), 173. 
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environmental contingencies and factors influencing the organization.55 In translation, the 
idea that an organization with a human resources structure designed to work well within 
kinetic environments, such as NSW, that realistically operates within irregular 
environments is a misfit.  This chapter presents this misfit by first providing an analysis 
of the larger and NSW environments based on U.S. strategic guidance and indicates why 
the environment can be classified as being unstable and complex.  Second, it describes 
the blend of mechanistic and professional bureaucratic characteristics that enable NSW to 
manage and coordinate direct action and special reconnaissance centric tasks in a kinetic 
and complex environment.  Third, it discusses NSW people, their strong organizational 
culture and how it has a clear sense of its identity and purpose to serve with honor by 
meeting the nation’s most lethal threats.  
SEALs are professionals who want to be effective.  NSW is effective in 
conducting direct action and special reconnaissance missions overseas because the NSW 
culture and people are a fit to meet these kinetically focused mission sets.  However, do 
the internal processes of the traditional NSW Troop meet an environment shaped by 
irregular warfare?  We argue that the NSW Troop does not effectively meet the needs of 
today’s irregular environment.  The next chapter uses the SOCCE on the Embassy 
Country Team in Nigeria to analyze a how a traditionally trained NSW unit is not 
adequately prepared to operate within the context of irregular warfare.  
                                                 
55 Donaldson, The Contingency Theory of Organizations, 1. 
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III. SOCCE NIGERIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
We promote the SOCCE as one organizational model for NSW to develop and 
institutionalize its 3-D capabilities to fashion its effectiveness in the long term, irregular 
warfare mission.  The current Special Operations Command Africa’s (SOCAFRICA) 
strategy places a heavy emphasis on “by, with and through” to collaborate with the 
interagency and partner nations in order to promote regional stability, combat terrorism 
and advance U.S. strategic objectives.  This chapter examines our personal experience on 
a previous SOCCE attached to the U.S. Embassy Country Team in Abuja, Nigeria. 
Nigeria is one of SOCAFRICA’s identified key partner nations (KPNs) where NSW has 
current strategic interests. 56  The chapter first describes the 3-D environment—
“Operators executing missions across the construct of Defense, Diplomacy, and 
Development”—and how it pertains to SOF in countries like Nigeria. 57  It analyzes 
SOF/interagency integration on the country team to demonstrate the notion the 3-D 
Construct with civil affairs, information operations and building a counterterrorism 
capacity.  It highlights the KPN’s growing radical Islamic movement to set the stage for 
how NSW is a primary agent in the current effort to counter violent extremism.  
Second, it describes the embassy environment and its challenges through a NSW 
lens with insight into the field of low intensity missions—the SOF and interagency 
differences in ways of doing business.  Third, it describes the importance of the irregular 
warfare mission and the challenges for NSW to bring continuity to the mission.  A 
frequent turnover of NSW personnel with temporary duty assignments fragments critical 
relationships with country team members, which are imperative for success in the long-
term mission. The chapter illustrates how a small SOF team was an anomaly.  Despite 
being under prepared for this type of 3-D mission, the team was able to establish a 
Nigerian counterterrorism unit and overcome significant diplomatic obstacles.  However, 
                                                 
56 SOF-Theater Strategic Objectives (S-TSOs) and Key Partner Nations (KPNs) are terms derived 
from SOCAFRICA’s Country Action Plan (CAP). 
57 USSOCOM Strategic Plan. 
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even though the SOCCE was successful in the end, the mission lacked continuity due to 
the frequent turnover of SOF teams cycling through short duration deployments. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show how current SEAL team training discussed in Chapter 
II is inadequate to prepare operators to take on these types of 3-D roles. To achieve 
greater long-term results, proper resourcing of regionally focused SOF personnel will be 
needed to have a greater impact on countering the growing threat of transnational 
terrorism with host nation capacity building.  
B. SOCCE PROCESSES 
It is also necessary to remember that the DoS serves as the lead USG 
department for combating terrorism overseas, which brings the 
interagency process immediately into play.  It is not a DoD ‘show’ 
alone.58  JSOU CT Reference Manual.  
A primary role for the SOCCE in Nigeria was to establish rapport and integrate 
with all personnel in the embassy country team.  Success in the embassy mission can be 
distilled into one ingredient: relationships.  Once again, this emphasizes the critical 
importance of human resources to the NSW organization.  The SOCCE Commander 
routinely met with country team department heads and Nigerian executive service 
officials to develop relationships in order to set up special operations training and 
exercises.  This was the diplomacy dimension of the job, which Hocevar, Thomas, and 
Jansen refer to as using social capital as a lateral mechanism and establishing a network.  
They write, “Collaboration is attained through a personal touch, a handshake and a 
smile.”59  Once the training received approval, the SOCCE’s Joint Planning Advisory 
Team (JPAT) established a program of instruction to train and select the right personnel 
to fulfill the first Nigerian Counterterrorism (CT) Battalion and build up the host nation’s 
 
 
                                                 
58 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism 
Reference Manual (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009), 2. 
59 Susan Hocevar, Gail Thomas and Erik Jansen, Innovation through Collaboration: Building 
Collaborative Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness (Oxford: Elsevier 
Ltd., 2006), 267. 
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counterterrorism capability.  In addition, the SOCCE Commander managed the other 
special operations assets, which focused mostly on the development dimension of the 
SOF mission: Army and Navy Civil Affairs and Information Operations.  
The civil military support element (CMSE), which conducted the majority of 
SOCCE missions, dug wells to provide clean water to remote villages and refurbished 
schools to improve education for children.  The military information support team 
(MIST) worked with local media organizations to distribute messages with American 
democratic values.  Both teams provided unprecedented access and placement for the 
SOCCE in often politically sensitive parts of the country because they engendered the 
trust of the local people.  Their combined efforts developed the country’s economic 
infrastructure and empowered Nigerians by working with local contracting businesses 
and bringing capital to austere locations.  The focus of the CMSE and MIST was 
population centric, not threat or enemy centric.  Altogether, the SOCCE was a team of 
regional experts who leveraged the resources and assets of the country team to synthesize 
the TSOC’s country action plan (CAP), which was the general’s published goals for the 
SOF team in country, with the Ambassador’s Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), which was 
the document that guided the country team towards national objectives.  This was no easy 
task because the CAP and the MSP were two separate strategic plans that often had 
conflicting interests; this meant the SOCCE members had to please two different bosses 
with two separate agendas.  This is one of the challenges of the 3-D operator: adeptly 
navigating through the matrices of military and diplomatic bureaucracies.60  These are 
skills that are not imparted in traditional NSW training.      
Within the ambassador’s MSP for the U.S. campaign in Nigeria, the SOCCE was 
responsible for building the infrastructure to assist the Nigerian government with 
developing a counterterrorism capacity.  In October 2008, the Nigerian Ministry of 
Defense officially requested that the U.S. Embassy assist them with developing a national 
joint counterterrorism force. The SOCCE Commander was tasked with establishing this 
unit from the ground up, because nothing existed in the way of Nigerian Special 
                                                 
60 Matrix bureaucracies are structures where two or more bosses exist.  These structures rely heavily 
on the judgment and interpersonal skills of the employee, which in this case is the SOCCE. 
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Operations.  Ultimately, he provided the framework for doctrine, task organization and 
force disposition for the strategic CT unit.  However, because the SOCCE was not a large 
enough unit to independently accomplish this task, it had to use USSOCOM’s episodic 
Joint Combined Exercise and Training (JCET) events with SEAL/Special Forces teams.  
The JCETs would conduct a Special Operations Program of Instruction to screen 
personnel from the Nigerian joint services for the national CT force.  The U.S. 
Department of Defense allocated $7.9 million in 1206 CT funding to train and equip the 
Nigerian CT force to execute unilateral special operations in the desert, jungle, mountain, 
and riverine environments.  
The Ministry of Defense requested a U.S. Special Operations unit because 
counterterrorism is a high priority for the Nigerian government, and it wanted expert 
instruction.  U.S. Embassy Political/Military Officers helped draft CT legislation to 
request government funding and expedite approval in the Nigerian Senate.  This was 
because Nigeria remains a strategically important country for the United States with its 
growing terrorist threat and its abundance of crude oil.  According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, as of September 2010, Nigeria was the third largest exporter 
of oil to the United States behind Mexico and Canada.61  Reliant on oil to keep its 
economic engine running, the United States is often at the mercy of militant groups like 
the Movement of Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which formed in January 
2006 and routinely abducts Western oil workers, sabotages pipelines and engages in 
armed conflicts with government forces.62  The group is small, but their efforts have 
proven effective at disrupting Nigeria’s production and export of oil, which threatens to 
politically and economically destabilize the West African state even more.   
 
                                                 
61 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Imports by Country of Origin,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm, (accessed June 14, 
2010). 
62 The United States consumes 27 percent of global oil each year, according to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). Wang Yuheng, “China’s Pipelineistan ‘War,’” October 12, 2010, Mother Jones, 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/10/china-natural-gas-pipeline-central-asia (accessed June 14, 2010). 
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The northern part of Nigeria has seen a growing number of radical Islamic groups.  
In October 2010, the online website Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor reported that Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has Nigerian representation in its ranks and is 
increasing its outreach in support of the Nigerian jihadist group known as Boko Haram, 
or the Nigerian Taliban.  After the sectarian violence in the northern city of Jos in July 
2010, AQIM urged Nigerian Muslims to wage war against the Christian minority, stating, 
“We are prepared to provide weapons training to your sons along with men, arms, 
ammunition and supplies.”63  This message supplemented Ansar-al-Mujahideen’s 
(jihadist web forum) online video in support of jihad in Nigeria, which encouraged Boko 
Haram, whose goal is to overthrow the state government in Nigeria and to implement 
strict Islamic law and abolish what it calls “Western-style education.”64 AQIM’s efforts 
to align extremist groups in Nigeria is another reason why the country remains a key 
partner nation with SOCAFRICA and is central to the USG in preventing extremist 
proliferation in the Trans-Sahara.  The small NSW teams charged with helping Nigeria 
build a CT force have the ability to enhance host nation and interagency capabilities with 
the right pre-deployment training and long-term commitment of selected personnel.  In 
the long term they can dramatically change Nigeria’s geostrategic landscape by training 
organically grown security forces.  
C. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY 
One of the daily challenges for the SOCCE was staying above the always-present 
DoS-DoD working rivalries and not committing any blunders that would adversely affect 
                                                 
63 “The Tightening Ties between Nigerian Boko Haram and Al Qaeda,” The Jihad and Terrorism 
Threat Monitor, posted October 3, 2010, 
http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=3866&param=IDTA (accessed June 14, 
2010). 
64 Joe Boyle, “Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Enigma,” BBC News, July 31 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8172270.stm (accessed June 24, 2010); Evan Kohlmann. “A Beacon for 
Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 2 (February 2010): 1. 
According to the February 2010 edition of the CTC Sentinel published by West Point, Evan Kohlmann 
Ansar-al-Mujahideen’s is a “contemporary jihadist discussion forum website. The website began in 2008 as 
a rather low-frills, Arabic-language clone forum with questionable credibility, and a membership of mostly 
silent observers. Today, however, the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum has blossomed into a prolific, multi-
language enterprise with an enviable following of skilled and highly-motivated English-speaking 
members.” Kohlmann. “A Beacon for Extremists.” 
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subsequent SOCCEs.  SOF personnel rotating every few months made it difficult to 
maintain trust with the country team, which takes many years to establish.  The calculated 
risk-taking and assertive personalities that are common with SOF personnel often clash 
with the cautious personalities of individuals comfortable in professional bureaucracies, 
such as Foreign Service Officers.  This personality conflict is exacerbated when a liberty 
incident occurs and military personnel are at fault.   
One SOCCE in particular ran into this problem.  The blunder involved SOCCE 
personnel driving under the influence of alcohol in a rental vehicle with unauthorized 
diplomatic plates; they crashed through the compound wall of the Belgium Embassy.  
Although no personnel were seriously hurt and the wall was immediately fixed (official 
apologies followed promptly), the incident caused public embarrassment for the embassy 
on a multi-nation front and was out of line with the low profile and good order and 
discipline that SOF holds itself to.  Prior to the accident the ambassador had learned 
about the rental vehicle with diplomatic plates and admonished the SOCCE Commander 
to remove them.  He failed to carry out her order and was declared persona non grata 
(PNG)—officially banned from country—by the ambassador after the accident for 
demonstrating leadership incompetence and not enforcing proper liberty discipline 
among his troops.  The ambassador subsequently shut down all SOCCE operations for six 
months, extinguishing all momentum in advancing SOCCE capital in country.  Follow on 
SOCCEs had to start at ground zero to re-establish trust with the front office and make 
reparations to the SOF’s professional reputation.65  The setback broke the trust between 
the SOCCE and ambassador, damaging the precious personal relationships needed for 
success in the long-term mission.66   
Understanding the different dynamics within country team meetings and the 
accepted language took time.  Following his first country team meeting experience, the 
SOCCE Commander learned from the Deputy Defense Attaché that the acronym “ODA,” 
or Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, could easily be misconstrued by state 
                                                 
65 Front Office refers to the ambassador, her deputy, and staff. 
66 This story is based of the after action report of the SOCCE team associated with this incident and 
the personal experience of one of the authors that filled the SOCCE role many months after it occurred.   
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officials in the embassy.  It carried the connotation of a Special Forces detachment 
coming to participate with host nation forces to conduct capture/kill operations in 
Nigeria. Nigerians, along with State Department personnel, often fear that USSOF or 
other military forces will further destabilize a country with kinetic missions.  This is a 
result of the ample TV coverage on Iraq and Afghanistan, where bombings routinely rock 
urban cities and cause pandemonium among the local populace.  The wrong choice of 
words in an embassy meeting has vast repercussions because of how negatively the 
public can react to a news release, regardless of whether they are true or not.  Any public 
acknowledgement of U.S. Special Operations involvement in anything other than training 
Nigerian troops could potentially cause a media firestorm that the ambassador would 
have had to answer for.  The right choice of words, which are soft in overtones and do 
not leave room for interpretation, was paramount when briefing both Nigerian and 
American officials on non-kinetic missions because they help to dispel preconceived 
notions that Special Operations Forces are only in country to capture/kill terrorists.      
At the time, the U.S. Chief of Mission for Nigeria was not comfortable with the 
SOCCE pursuing low visibility operations.  A lack of trust still remained with the 
ambassador over the SOCCE team.  She was reluctant to reinstate its full operational 
status because of the incident that happened many months prior and resulted in the PNG 
of the SOCCE Commander.  Other than digging wells, refurbishing schools, supporting 
local media distribution and helping the Nigerians create a CT capability through JCETs, 
the SOCCE was restricted in fulfilling its operational outreach potential.  
Missions involving operational preparation of the environment (OPE) or human 
intelligence (HUMINT) collection—usually executed by the Military Liaison Element 
(MLE)—were out of the question.67  HUMINT missions were for the CIA, as far as the 
                                                 
67 Joint Publication 3-13 defines OPE as “non-intelligence activities conducted to plan and prepare for 
potential follow-on military operations” conducted under Title 10 authority. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1998), www.c4i.org/jp3_13.pdf (accessed June 14, 2010).  Michael T. Kenney, “Leveraging Operational 
Preparation of the Environment in the GWOT,” A Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort 
Leavenworth, KA: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2005–2006).  Kenney adds, 
“Through predictive analysis and preemptive action, the United States can identify potential terrorist 
support areas, enhance situational understanding of these regions, and set the conditions to find, fix, and 
finish terrorists in these locations as or even before they take root.” 
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ambassador was concerned, and the Theater Special Operation Command (TSOC) could 
not adequately convince her how their missions differed.  Regardless of the fact that the 
Special Operations Forces fell under the command and control of the TSOC (by 
regulation in the National Security Decision Directive-38) all SOCCE missions still had 
to be passed up in a memorandum through the front office and receive signature approval 
by the COM.68 Technically, she did not have this authority because, at the time, the Joint 
Special Operations Task Force under SOCEUR made the go, no-go decision on SOCCE 
missions.  However, it was tacitly understood by the TSOC that the ambassador’s trust 
with the SOCCE would suffer if she did not have signature approval.  In the end, she 
ultimately wielded the ability to impede the TSOC’s progress by reducing the SOCCE’s 
access by denying their embassy and country clearances if she was kept out of the 
decision process.  Again, working for two bosses created a constant friction for the 
SOCCE because it often added additional layers of bureaucracy.  
The TSOC did not want to relinquish control of its forces by permanently 
assigning them to the embassy, because if the mission in Nigeria went away the forces 
would have to be reassigned to another country.  However, the ambassador did not like 
having a unit that she could not control or ensure would work toward her strategic plan 
on her country team.  From her perspective this made sense.  As it is stated in the 
SOF/Interagency CT Reference Manual produced by JSOU: “The Chief of Mission is 
head of the country team and must translate the interagency policies, strategies and plans 
into productive action on the ground.  The COM has the discretionary authority to 
organize their country team in whatever fashion they see fit.”69  If the SOCCE had made 
the decision to conduct its operations without the COM’s approval, she could have 
                                                 
68 U.S. Department of State, “NSDD-38: Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas 
Constituent Posts,” April 26, 2002, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/45148.htm 
(accessed June 14, 2010). The National Security Decision Directive dated June 2, 1982, gives the Chief of 
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to ensure that special operations troops can easily be reassigned to another area if the mission in that 
country goes away.  U.S. Department of State, “NSDD-38.” 
69 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces, Chapter 2–1.   
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countered by eliminating the unit’s position on the country team.  Each department in the 
embassy lived by the rule of “choosing battles” with the ambassador.   
A lack of discretion can instantly dissolve key relationships with the country team 
and front office despite the years it took to develop them—as the SOCCE liberty incident 
illustrated.  If the ambassador deems that unit is no longer an asset to the country team, 
she may terminate its embassy access at her discretion.  Truncated embassy access is 
potentially devastating to any Department of Defense entity in a country where no U.S 
military bases are present because, in a failing state such as Nigeria, force protection 
measures dramatically increase for a unit operating without the infrastructure support of 
the State Department.  Most countries in Africa are not like Afghanistan or Iraq, where 
massive DoD forward operating bases—serviced by Kellogg, Brown, and Root—exist.  
Without an embassy’s protection and resources a small group of special operations 
personnel cannot be expected to accomplish its goals. 
D. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES  
The open format in which a U.S. embassy operates is another unfamiliar 
environment for NSW operators.  In the world of special operations, which relies heavily 
on secrecy, transparency is not intuitive; the operator is accustomed to 
compartmentalization and special access programs and usually lives in the shadows 
during overseas operations.  Being forthcoming about the intricacies of a mission to 
multiple individuals on the country team—even though those with comparable security 
clearances—carries a risk to the operator because of the open embassy culture about day-
to-day operations.  From the embassy’s perspective, openness facilitated dialogue, which 
allowed department heads to synthesize efforts in favor of their common mission. From 
the SOCCE’s perspective, compartmentalization and limited visibility protected the 
mission by minimizing exposure.  While the SOCCE believed not everyone on the 
country team had a “need to know” about their missions, the ambassador ultimately 
mandated that most of the department heads did, noting that what the SOCCE did in the 
field had the potential to affect the missions of other country team departments. 
Synthesizing all efforts would to contribute to the overarching mission strategic plan. 
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A department on the country team that was outside the normal inclusion scope of 
SOCCE operations sometimes needed access to that information in order to provide the 
Special Operations team with adequate support for its mission.  For example, the Public 
Affairs Officer (PAO) did not usually have a need to know about SOCCE missions.  
However, a major combined joint training exercise between U.S. and Nigerian troops 
warranted the PAO’s knowledge to prepare public release statements—approved by the 
ambassador—in case a Nigerian news story was leaked about the event.  One of the 
constant challenges for the embassy’s PAO was to prevent misleading stories in the 
Nigerian media that would undermine U.S. credibility.  Other countries that have a 
presence in most African countries and compete for natural resources (e.g., Russia and 
China)) often engage in political subterfuge by manipulating the local media into 
spinning fraudulent stories and disparaging the United States.  The PAO described a 
hypothetical example in which a Nigerian newspaper might print something like “U.S. 
Special Forces secretly train Nigerian troops as a cover to conduct capture/kill missions 
against radical Islamists in the North.”70  Conspiracy stories are a common tactic by other 
countries to undermine U.S. credibility in the host nation.  The ambassador was always 
adamant about transparency, believing strong inter-communication among departments 
would stave off disinformation and contribute to the country team mission as a whole.  
As sensible as it may sound, this model was not typically how special operations 
personnel conducted business, and it was often a point of friction between the SOCCE 
and the front office.  
E. THE IRREGULAR ENVIRONMENT 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a typical tour for a SEAL is spent either with 
his troop prosecuting terrorist capture/kill missions in a combat theater or executing joint 
combined exercise and training (JCETs) events in non-combat theaters.  However, the job 
profile of a SEAL today is more comprehensive than it was in the past because of 
increased deployments, with higher operational tempo, to different theaters of operations 
performing a multitude of roles.  The role and task complexity is especially increasing as 
                                                 
70 This was a discussion between the SOCCE and Embassy Public Affairs Office on the importance of 
staying on ahead of news releases to report accuracy and limit potentially damaging stories. 
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NSW and the interagency are becoming more interwoven in order to meet today’s 
complex challenges.  The transnational nature of radical Islamic organizations and their 
proliferation in countries with weakened or failing states—such as Nigeria, which lists as 
number fourteen on the 2010 failed states index—requires SOF personnel to have a 
position on embassy teams in countries where there is no dominant U.S. military 
presence and where the host nation lacks the resources to effectively counter radical 
groups.71  In October 2010, militants from the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) detonated two car bombs in Abuja, killing eight people during a 
public ceremony celebrating Nigeria’s fiftieth anniversary of independence.72  The 2009 
Christmas “underwear bomber” was also a Nigerian who received training in Yemen, 
although he failed in his attempt to detonate his explosive briefs on an airline inbound for 
Detroit. These examples illustrate the importance and immediacy of the issue, which 
necessitates enhancing information sharing between all SOF and interagency assets and 
to take alternative measures to interdict AQIM lines of communication and outreach 
programs where direct military action is not an option.  In Afghanistan and Iraq, CT 
forces would target these threats through direct action, but that option does not exist in 
Nigeria, which is not a declared war zone where U.S. forces can prosecute kinetic 
capture/kill operations.  The political environment requires an indirect approach by SOF 
and the interagency in order to get to the root of the problem.    
Nigeria is just one example of an African country with a growing domestic and 
international terrorist threat that needs USG support to reinforce its CT apparatus.  In his 
article in the 2010 May/June edition of Foreign Affairs, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
comments: 
In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States' safety 
and security—a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—
are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves 
                                                 
71 Foreign Policy, “Failed States Index 2010,” Foreign Policy (June–July 2010), Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_ranking
s (accessed June 14, 2010). 
72 “Deadly Blasts near Parade in Nigeria,” New York Times, October 1, 2010, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/10/01/world/africa/international-us-nigeria.html?_r=2&hp (accessed 
June 14, 2010). 
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or secure their own territory.  Dealing with such fractured or failing states 
is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.73  
The challenge the United States government (USG) faces is synthesizing all of the 
components of national power—the whole-of-government approach—and empowering 
failed or weakened states with the resources necessary to counter the global extremist 
threat.  As it states in the SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual of the 
Joint Special Operations University: “No single department, agency, or organization of 
the U.S. Government (USG) can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist 
networks, groups and individuals.”74  NSW’s role in collaborative CT efforts is critical 
because its operators are gaining more of a presence in these types of 3-D roles.  State 
Department officials often have limited knowledge of SOF capabilities and the 
responsibility is on the operator to educate them on what SOF resources can be provided 
to a country team’s counterterrorism campaign plan.    
1. The Operator 
With Al Qaeda developing franchise networks and affiliates around the world 
(e.g., Arabian Peninsula, AQIM—Trans-Sahara) the battlefield is becoming more 
complex for SOF, which has a heightened role in irregular warfare across a wide 
spectrum of different cultures.  The overarching theme in USSOCOM’s Strategic Plan’s 
“Implementation Tasks of Focus Area 1: The Operator” is developing SOF to understand 
the differences in cultures—traditional languages and customs of a people—of a country 
and operate more effectively in the disparate working environments where they are 
deployed.  Implementation Tasks 1.2 to 1.5 have overtones of the actions of T.E. 
Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), the British liaison officer who played an influential 
role in orchestrating the Arab Revolt of 1916–18.  The Tasks state, “Build long-term trust 
with populations, local/regional officials, and foreign security forces; understand how to 
create local development programs and integrate them with broader interagency efforts;  
 
                                                 
73 Robert M. Gates, Defense Secretary, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010. 
74 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces, 1–1. 
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and develop regional/local expertise and diplomacy skills.”75  USSOCOM’s viewpoint is 
that the geostrategic perspective is not about the specific nature of the threat so much as it 
is about the people and their environment.   
USSOCOM’s strategy recognizes that today’s challenges are much more complex 
and entrenched than can be addressed through pure direct action, and, as such, success 
“requires an understanding of the root causes of global problems as well as the systemic 
relationships that connect these issues across regions.”76  USSOCOM argues that shifting 
the focus from the threat to the population is the key to this approach; however, the 
majority of NSW training does not prepare an operator with this type of mindset.  
2. The Misfit 
The traditional six-month SEAL team and Special Activity Team deployments do 
not lend continuity to the long-term mission that is required for an operator to gain 
regional expertise and develop relationships with the host nation.  It also is difficult for 
new Special Operations teams to establish credibility and trust with the permanent 
embassy country team members because of their frequent turnover.  SEAL teams 
typically rotate their personnel in and out of the AFRICOM Theater every six months, as 
was the case for SOCCE Nigeria; the individuals are there to execute a specific mission, 
and they usually never see the country again.  By the time the team gets the mission off 
the ground and makes a few tangible strides, they are ready to redeploy; continuity 
becomes an issue because the new team has to establish a new relationship with the 
country team.  Foreign Service Officers who deploy to an embassy for three years 
regarded the SOCCE’s high turnover rate as damaging to the overall mission because 
relationships become fragmented and only a few tangible results are achieved.  As 
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen argue, continuity at the mid-management level is a key 
ingredient for success in building collaborative capacity.  It is the difference of being 
forced to do something (external incentive) and wanting to do something (internal 
incentive).  They hypothesize that “interagency interactions that are based solely on 
                                                 
75 USSOCOM Strategic Plan, 8. 
76 Ibid., 6.  
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external [rather than internal] incentives will not develop a sustainable collaborative 
orientation or necessary collaborative capacity unless participating organizations are able 
to successfully develop social networks.”77  The Naval Special Warfare Anchor 
Detachments—regionally focused teams with a more permanent presence—discussed in 
the subsequent chapter are potentially a solution to this problem. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The SOCCE Nigeria was filled with traditional SEAL team members who were 
not adequately trained for the mission; however, 180 days after the official Nigerian 
request, the SOCCE initiated the largest Special Operations Joint Combined Exercise and 
Training of record between the United States and Nigeria in March 2009.  One hundred 
forty-three candidates from the Nigerian Army, Air Force and Navy started the CT 
selection course.  This achievement was an anomaly for the SOCCE Nigeria.  A Nigerian 
counterterrorism battalion continues to grow to this day as SEAL platoons cycle in and 
out of the country to train the host nation soldiers in special operations tactics.  However, 
the battalion’s success did not come without the SOCCE overcoming significant 
structural, cultural and diplomatic hurdles—people overcoming a misfit—on the Nigerian 
side, which threatened to cancel the entire program before it even started.  The lack of 
organization and continuity in the Nigerian government and their defense services made 
it difficult for USSOF to support the Nigerians in establishing a robust counterterrorism 
campaign strategy.  Fortunately, with the arduous efforts by all members inside the U.S. 
embassy country team—knowing the right people in the right places within the Nigerian 
government—the Nigerian national CT program was saved prior to Special Operations 
Command Europe cancelling the exercise.  The relationships between the SOCCE and 
country team were the key to success in establishing the CT unit, which was deemed a 
strategic success by the U.S. Embassy.  
This chapter uses the Special Operations Command and Control Element on the 
U.S. embassy country team in Abuja, Nigeria as an example of the diplomatic, 
development and defense roles special operations personnel are routinely tasked with in 
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the current irregular warfare paradigm. The intent is to convey to the reader how the 
current NSW inter-deployment training cycle of preparing SEALs for war (threat 
focused) is not adequate for preparing them with the necessary skills to excel in an 
embassy working environment (population focused).  The chapter then gives an overview 
of the SOCCE and the disparate types of missions they carried out in country and segued 
into the cultural differences, command and control issues over mission approval authority 
that stem from NSDD-38, and how Nigeria is part of the epidemic of transnational 
terrorism influencing weakened or failed states.  To achieve greater continuity with the 
country team and success in the long-term mission, NSW will have to dedicate regionally 
focused operators to resource this type of 3-D mission.   
 48
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 49
IV. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE ANCHOR DETACHMENTS 
The environment in which we find ourselves has changed.  Instead of 
traditional nation-state conflict, both USSOCOM’s and USSOF’s assigned 
missions are predominantly focused on addressing non-state or 
transnational violent extremist threats.  Future threats are emerging more 
from the complex convergence of crime, migration, and extremism and 
less from traditional nation-state adversaries.78  
Admiral Olson, USSOCOM Commander 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 2009, the commanding officer of Naval Special Warfare 
Command, Admiral Winters, initiated a program designated Naval Special Warfare 
Anchor Detachments (NSWADs).  This was in response to the needs of the long war, or 
what USSOCOM refers to as the need for, “…regionally oriented, long term engagement 
in key countries/regions in order to enable foreign internal defense/security force 
assistance (FID/SFA) in those areas and provide embedded advise/assist functions.”79 
This chapter gives an introduction to NSWADs within NSW Special Activity (SA) 
Teams’ chain of command and proposes how they are one solution to the irregular 
warfare problem. It argues that the NSWAD operators, not traditional SEAL team 
operators, are a better fit for 3-D missions, such as SOCCE Nigeria, because they have 
the appropriate interagency and regional training.  Second, it demonstrates that NSWADs 
is a 3-D operator “fit” over the long term because, as an open system, NSWADs will 
adjust to the contingencies presented by the environment and embrace what USSOCOM 
refers to as “indirect” means.80  Third, it shows how it is problematic for the NSW 
community to rapidly overcome its traditional culture of “direct” means in order to  
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relationships. 
 50
embrace a new culture.81  Finally, this chapter examines the environmental contingencies 
that influence the NSWAD organization, its internal processes, and how this organization 
aligns with the needs of the 3-D operator. 
B. A 3-D “FIT” IN THE LONG TERM 
In August of 2010, the Commander of International Security Forces-Afghanistan 
(ISAF), General David Petraeus, released his first edition of COIN guidance to the 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of NATO ISAF and U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan.  Listed in his guidance are 24 tasks.  Not until the fifth task does the phrase, 
“Pursue the enemy relentlessly” appear.  The first four tasks are as follows: “Secure and 
serve the population;” “Live among the people;” “Help confront the culture of impunity;” 
and, finally, “Help Afghans win accountable governance.”82  This is significant because 
we believe that, from a NSW perspective, the last 30 years of NSW IDTC and ten years 
of conflict have been largely focused on directly combating the enemy with U.S. forces 
rather than empowering other nations through capacity building to engage their own 
populations and fight an irregular enemy.  “Diplomacy” and “development” themes are 
emphasized throughout ISAF’s guidance.  Based on successful COIN decisions in Iraq, 
General Petraeus states that indirect rather than direct means should be the preponderance 
of U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.  Further justification for capacity building 
comes from Admiral James Stavridis, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, who 
believes, “Foreign military training is the most important long-term activity our military 
undertakes in terms of delivering security in this century.  It is the way forward—so long 
as the wars go as planned.”83  Enhancing regional security in this century is a task the 
NSWAD organization is postured to accomplish.  
                                                 
81 Direct means includes those capabilities that aggressively counter adversaries.  
82 Commander International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, COMISAF's 
Counterinsurgency Guidance (Kabul, Afghanistan, 2010). 
83 Kevin Baren, “Pentagon Sees Training Allies as its Greatest Hope,” Stars and Stripes (July 30 
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C. THE NSWAD ORGANIZATION 
According to the NSWAD tasking order (TASKORD),84 the long-term strategy 
for NSWADs is as follows: “…persistent presence and focus will have the effect of 
convincing counterparts that NSW is partnered for ‘the long haul’ while also reducing 
knowledge disconnects that occur as main force units deploy into and out of respective 
areas of responsibility (AOR).”85  
The NSWADS comprise operators with regional expertise who have the proper 
training and skills to conduct irregular warfare missions.  They encompass the 
“development” and “diplomatic” dimensions of the 3-D operator, allowing NSW to 
embody all dimensions of USSOCOMs 3-D construct.  The following are vision-driving 
declarations for NSWADs as stated by its TASKORD as well as tactical leadership 
figures:  
Ideally, as we begin to have personnel go out on successful deployments 
to the same locations, refine their language and cultural skills, and fully 
understand the problem sets particular to their country, the NSWADs will 
create a pool of regional experts embedded with partner units in key 
locations.  They will provide persistent capacity building and situational 
awareness and over time will be able to share information and influence 
host nation operations in favor of U.S. objectives.  NSWADs will also 
serve as early warning for potential crisis and will provide continuous 
situational awareness to the Theater Special Operation Commands 
(TSOCs).86  
These assertions combine to illustrate NSWAD’s broad-spectrum plan for dealing 
with the environmental influences or contingencies that require an indirect approach.  
The next section outlines the strategic, operational, and tactical environmental 
contingencies that NSW must address in order to remain relevant.  
                                                 
84 Edward G. Winters, III. “TASKORD for NSW Anchor Team Realignment,” December 1, 2009 
(Coronado, CA). The Tasking Order is from an official message promulgated to the NSW force by the 
Commander NAVSPECWARCOM initiating NSWADs. 
85 Winters, III, “TASKORD for NSW Anchor Team Realignment.” 
86 Anonymous SEAL Special Activities Team 1, interview with author, August 2010. 
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D. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENCIES 
USSOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric Olson, wrote the following regarding the 
new environment within which NSW must operate successfully: “The complexity of the 
current strategic environment requires that SOF Operators maintain not only the highest 
levels of warfighting expertise but also regional knowledge and diplomacy skills.”87  The 
current environment facing NSW with the long war has produced contingencies that 
USSOF, specifically NSW, must address in order to remain relevant.  These 
contingencies influence NSW across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 
conflict and directly affect NSW structure, task, and culture by forcing change in order to 
remain effective.   
Environmental contingencies and their affects on NSW are presented in Table 3.  
Column 1 represents NSW structure at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the 
larger environment.  At the strategic level, globalization has created a super-empowered 
individual.  That super-empowered individual affects NSW by forcing its leadership to 
reconfigure the force structurally as well as alter NSW areas of operation (AORs) to 
consider the irregular threat.  At the operational level, structure is altered by 
USSOCOM’s call for NSW to align with the 3-D operator concept.  At the tactical level, 
NSW structure is affected because a larger force required to lethally combat an enemy is 
no longer prudent.  The 3-D environment requires smaller units focused on the indirect 
approach and garnering interagency assets through collaboration.  
Column two represents NSW tasks at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels 
of the larger environment.  At the strategic level NSW tasking is altered to reflect the 
COCOM’s request for smaller DoD footprints overseas as larger footprints are ill advised 
in IW. At the operational level, language, culture, and regional knowledge become a 
higher priority of focus for the TSOCS translating to a new focus for NSW.  At the 
tactical level, NSW deploys to new AORs requiring indirect assistance. 
 
                                                 
87 U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010, 1. 
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Column three represents NSW culture at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of the larger environment.  At the strategic level, NSW operational units must 
move away from a culture that deploys large numbers of personnel to a single AOR.  A 
more self-reliant unit that does not require administration/logistics personnel for example 
must be adopted to alleviate the need for a larger U.S. military footprint.  At the 
operational level, the NSW operator must adopt a new mindset embracing the METLs 
associated with the new IW mission.  At the tactical level the individual NSW operator 
needs to adopt a new mindset in order to be competent and safe at the new METLs 
commensurate with IW mission sets. 
Table 3.   NSW Environment and Internal Processes Matrix88 
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Table 3 shows the affects at the strategic level on structure, task, and culture and 
how they have a top-down effect on the operational and tactical levels of the 
environment.  The decisions made by the strategic echelons of the NSW organization 
only take effect if they are embraced by the operator at the tactical level.  NSW prides 
itself on being a bottom-up organization, where much of the change in how it fights 
comes from the operators pushing new ideas to the top after recent combat experiences.  
If the operator does not contribute input to alterations in task, structure, or culture to 
embrace the 3-D Construct, then NSWADs chances for success will be limited.  
NSW has reprioritized its mission sets in order to achieve a more appropriate 
balance between direct and indirect means.  The result is a NSWADs mission list that 
seeks to accomplish different goals than those traditionally affiliated with NSW troops 
tasked with utilizing direct methods.  The following concept from NAVSPECWARCOM 
drives the task list that follows.  The last sentence explains NAVSPECWARCOM’s 
intention.  
The ability to conduct direct action operations of operational and strategic 
importance has and will continue to remain a core NSW capability.  
However, being the best at direct action (DA) does not and will not come 
at the expense of also being exceptional at irregular warfare (IW).  
NAVSPECWARCOM is directing the reinvestment and expansion of 
NSW indirect capabilities that have always been part of our primary 
mission.89 
The NSWAD task list yields two takeaways.  The first is that NSW needs to 
revitalize its irregular warfare capability.  Second, IW will not be diminished or 
overshadowed by any other mission set, including “direct missions.”  This is NSW’s 
commitment to IW.  NSWADs’ missions lean heavily toward establishing trust through 
capacity building with host nation partners, rather than conducting DA style missions 
against the enemy:  NSW’s focus since Vietnam.  Based on the new NSWAD mission 
list, NSW culture and mind set must be radically altered.  Immediate attempts to form 
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and deploy NSWADs are accompanied by the difficult task of altering internal processes, 
specifically culture.  A look at NSWADs human resources will reveal the personnel, 
configuration, and training associated with this new unit. 
Table 4.   NSWADs Mission Sets 
Conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
Conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
Perform Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) 
Conduct Information Warfare (IW) 
E. HUMAN RESOURCES 
From a human resources perspective, the larger environment introduced three key 
issues.  The first issue for NSW is recruiting and selecting individuals who fit the 3-D 
environment.  The second is introducing enough individuals to qualify as SEALs in order 
to populate NSW and maintain its health as a force.  A third issue is developing an 
indirect mindset within the NSW community.  According to Commander Havloc of 
NSW, “We are looking for a guy who has deployed to that area.  They have to be 
adaptable, mature and professionally seasoned with an affinity for this kind of work…”90 
All selectees, regardless of their military specialty, experience level, or level of affinity 
for the work, come from the same NSW community.  Below is an excerpt from the 
TASKORD that discusses this further: 
Each NSWAD shall initially consist of approximately six personnel 
comprised of [NSW workforce] from the rank of E-5 to O-5, and qualified 
civilians with previous military experience.  Each NSWAT (smaller team 
with the NSWAD that deploys to partner nation) will typically consist of 
one officer and two enlisted personnel.  Manning for NSWADs was pulled 
                                                 
90 Scott Williams, “A Long-Term Human Investment,” Navy SEAL ETHOS Magazine, no. 8 (2010):6, 
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from across NSW to include SEAL Teams, Naval Special Warfare Center 
(NSWCEN), Special Boat Teams, and Naval Special Warfare Groups.  
Several nomination boards were conducted which identified personnel 
who fit the requirements and eventually earmarked over 30 personnel 
ranging in rank from lieutenant to E-5 to fill the initial four deployment 
phases.  Members will possess a minimum experience of one (6 month) 
deployment to the region to which the NSWAD will be assigned.91 
While the excerpt annotates how NSWADs plan to man its force, it does not 
address the time needed to depart from NSW’s traditional and direct approach to 
conducting special operations.  Adapting to the NSWAD requisite mindset will be 
difficult in the short term.  
NSWADs will accomplish mission sets by “forming teams to embed with select 
partner nations forces and deploy for an initial twelve months.  Follow-on deployments 
will occur to the same specific location until a four year tour of duty is complete.”92 Even 
for an individual who embraces the NSWAD initiative, the deployment cycle that 
includes an entire year with host nation units is a significant leap from traditional six-
month NSW deployments.  This, once again, illustrates the need to build a bridge 
between culture and task. 
F. INTER-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING CYCLE (IDTC)  
The time allotted for IDTC schedules of traditional NSW troops and NSWADs 
are similar; however, the training focus is different between the two.   
NSWAD IDTC will be 10–12 months long just prior to deployment.  
Members must complete initial qualification training (IQT) to include, but 
not limited to language, instructor, SFA, regional and cultural 
familiarizations, and interagency training.  An individual’s initial 
deployment will be followed by a training cycle consisting of professional 
development, and assignment as a trainer for relevant positions or short 
augments overseas.93  
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92 Ibid., 2. 
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NSWAD personnel are asked to complete all of the normal baseline schools of 
their designator (SEAL/SWCC) in addition to completing the above-mentioned training.  
Additional training foci are primarily language capabilities, instructor qualifications, and 
understanding different regional sensitivities.  The indirect training pipeline is in stark 
contrast to the direct style of traditional training.  It creates a potential rift within the 
operator core.  This is because the difference between what is considered normal training 
for a SEAL and what is required for NSWADs is so great.  There are often no obvious 
incentives for a SEAL operator to become a champion of the indirect approach.  
According to the NSWADs TASKORD, “Small teams of regionally oriented 
SEALs operating with foreign and interagency partners predate all current task 
organization models.”94  While NSW historically produced structures based on 
environmental contingencies yielding small teams with regional foci, post Vietnam 
contingencies produced a vastly different structure.  During Vietnam, NSW deploying 
units ranged from four to eight members who focused largely on advisory roles.  Post-
Vietnam platoon structures focusing on “direct measures” have traditionally been 
characterized by a minimum of 16 members continuously training together over 18 
months towards direct style mission sets such as DA, SR, and maritime operations.  The 
METLS of these mission sets, such as land warfare and weapons handling skills, 
specifically emphasized unilateral action and not instruction or capacity building with 
host nation or other agencies.  According to one anonymous SEAL, “Only within the last 
few years has any NSW training been dedicated to host nation capacity building, and the 
majority of it still involved an entire [traditional] SEAL platoon or larger unit.”  He 
added, “All of my past work-ups [training] were geared toward three things… 
aggressively finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy.  Very little time, if any, has been 
devoted to training host nation defense forces.”95  A departure from these NSW 
structures and tasks focusing on direct means is a considerable undertaking considering 
the three and one half decades devoted to excellence through direct means. 
                                                 
94 Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, Tasking Order for Naval Special Warfare Anchor 
Detachments, 4. 
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G. METRICS OF SUCCESS 
We feel that the following sentiment from an individual within the NSW 
community indicates NSW’s past metrics of success were based on targeted killing.  “…I 
joined the SEAL Teams to kill terrorists.”96  These metrics of success were based on 
tangible items such as the number of enemy targets prosecuted or the number of enemy 
personnel neutralized.  Perhaps even the number of DA operations conducted might be 
added to this list.  These refer to “feedback.”97 Until recently, NSW has been using what 
cybernetics and systems theorists call negative or corrective feedback.  That is, feedback 
that assesses whether or not the output fits the purpose and goals of the organization. 
NSW was producing an effective product via training commensurate with DA style 
outputs.  However, when USSOCOM began to ask the question of whether it was 
meeting the environmental needs, NSW began to utilize “positive feedback” which, 
“…measures whether or not the purpose and goals align with environmental needs.”98  
This shift to indirect missions represents NSW’s transition to a less tangible but more 
appropriate metric based on the environment.  As a tactical leader involved with the 
NSWADs program suggested, “[NSWADs metrics of success] will be very hard to 
quantify…and may come in the form of evaluations and observations during bilateral 
training events.”99  This shift in metrics further demonstrates the key differences that will 
prove difficult for NSW personnel involved in NSWADs to culturally embrace.  Metrics 
can be viewed as one component on a list of many that combine to fashion culture.  Just 
as the metrics have changed, so must the culture of NSW. 
H. CULTURE 
NSW culture, until now, used direct means as the preferable way to operate.  As 
previously stated, NSW culture begins at BUD/S and is reinforced everyday an individual 
remains within NSW.  Regardless of the tasks for which NSW has claimed responsibility, 
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the focus or daily effort since Vietnam has been direct means.  Drawing on personal 
experience as SEALs, we make the case that little time has been devoted to indirect 
means in training.  This has resulted in a lack of understanding of the term “indirect.”  
Three inferences can be drawn from this common lack of understanding within NSW.  
The first is that NSW has created and devoted itself to a single-mindset culture that 
required a significant number of years and effort to establish.  The second is that when 
culture is instilled with institutions such as BUD/S, developed over time, and enabled 
further by combat experience, it facilitates a high degree of operational success: in this 
case, direct action mission successes as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The final inference 
is that culture is cyclical, and its perpetuation hinges on the individual operator.  If the 
operator does not internalize an indirect culture, he can never mentor or hope to instill an 
indirect culture.  Therefore, it is incumbent on NSW to “instill,” “develop,” and “enable” 
an indirect culture that co-exists with the traditional direct culture, and thereby achieves 
relevance in the long war.   
Based on these inferences, USSOCOM states accurately that the “Operator is the 
central focus of its efforts…”  It understands that without the operator, changes within 
USSOF cannot take place.  As a result, NSWAD personnel are left with an immense 
charge, which is to embrace a new culture based on instruction and not destruction, on 
regional familiarization and not unilateral missions.  Consequently, we feel that ordering 
the operator’s acceptance of a new culture without the “instilling,” “developing,” and 
“enabling” is, at best, difficult in the long term and virtually impossible in the short.  As 
NSWADs are new and virtually untested, the culture they require has been mapped out 
by a TASKORD but time will uncover NSWADs acceptance or deviation from that path 
as evident by its successes or failures.  
I. CONCLUSION 
First, this chapter introduces NSWADs as a long-term solution to the irregular 
warfare problem.  Second, it justifies the creation of NSWADs by emphasizing the 
importance of capacity building and regional security.  Third, it illustrates how current 
environmental contingencies affect NSWAD’s internal processes: structure, task, and 
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culture.  Fourth, it diagnoses NSWADs through the lens of human resources to 
distinguish the disparity between what training is currently providing to the operator vice 
what it needs to provide: an IW focus.  We then looked at metrics of success and the 
IDTC to highlight, once again, the gap between a traditional and irregular focus.  Finally, 
this chapter discussed culture and established that ample time is necessary to effectively 
change an organizational culture from one that is focused on the “direct” approach to the 
“indirect” approach because the operator, as the embodiment of NSW culture, cannot 
change over night.  This reinforces the key takeaway from this chapter: NSWADs is a 3-
D operator “fit” over the long term because as an open system NSW reacts to 
environmental contingencies and embraces indirect means.  It will be problematic 
however for this community to overcome the traditional culture of direct means, and this 
will ultimately make it extremely difficult for NSW to rapidly embrace a new culture.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
NSW will need to adapt in order to practice the 3-D operator initiative and 
effectively combat an irregular enemy.  Our thesis emerged from discussions concerning 
the frustration of NSW operators continually tasked to conduct recurring missions that 
they are ill prepared to execute.  Our intent was to start a conversation to entice and 
perhaps provoke NSW leadership to consider who it recruits and how it trains those 
recruits to conduct a range of military operations in a 3-D environment.  
Chapter I began with an anecdote to develop a vivid context for the reader and to 
illustrate the immediate sense of misfit where the SEAL operator was not prepared for the 
3-D environment because his training did not match the mission.  Next, this chapter 
defined USSOCOM’s 3-D construct.  Finally, it introduced organizational contingency 
theory to illustrate the importance of fit between an organization and its environment.  To 
accomplish our research goals, we took a systematic approach.   
Chapter II gave an organizational overview of NSW.  This chapter described the 
relevant factors of the NSW, its structure, tasks, people and culture and its larger 
environments; this allowed us to analyze the misfit between the current system and the 
challenges posed by a highly complex and unstable environment.  From a human 
resources point of view, the majority of the NSW force is considered to be a fit for 
operating in kinetic environments; however, it is a misfit for today’s non-kinetic 
environments.   
In Chapter III, we analyze a former Special Operations Command and Control 
Element (SOCCE) on the U.S. Embassy Country Team in Nigeria. The SOCCE is one of 
the key models for developing and institutionalizing NSW 3-D capabilities to effectively 
conduct irregular warfare missions.  The disparity between the NSW operator’s direct 
focused approach and the embassy’s indirect focused approach highlight the 
organizational challenge NSW must contend with in order to become more relevant 
toward fighting an irregular natured conflict.  Additionally, the mission lacks continuity 
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due to the frequent turnover of SOF teams cycling through short duration deployments.  
A change will need to come in how these missions are resourced with SOF personnel in 
order to achieve long-term results. 
Chapter IV provides an overview and analysis of NSWADs as the solution to 
operating in the irregular warfare paradigm by integrating with the interagency to meet 
national objectives.  We specifically argue that NSWADs offer a long-term solution to 
USSOCOM’s 3-D operator.  Environmental contingencies affecting NSW’s internal 
processes are addressed in order to demonstrate the difficulty of overcoming barriers 
currently embedded in the NSW culture; training and focus are compared to point out the 
dramatic differences in the goals of traditional NSW units and those of NSWADs.  
Modifying the lethally focused, assertive, and strong culture of SEAL operators cannot 
happen overnight; cultural change takes time.  Despite this nebulous forecast, once the 
storm of cultural change passes, operational successes of an irregular nature will occur.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research has argued—we hope convincingly—that NSW is not currently 
training or preparing its operators to comprehensively embrace the defense, development, 
and diplomacy vision put forth by USSOCOM in 2010.  Whereas USSOCOM envisions a 
3-D operator to appear skilled in all three dimensions, similar to Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.   USSOCOM’s 3-D Operator 
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Currently the SEAL team operator is not equipped with the skill sets required to 
be adept in the diplomacy and development dimensions of the 3-D construct.  Figure 10 
illustrates where we feel the current SEAL team operator lies. 
 
Figure 10.   Typical SEAL Operator within 3-D Construct 
So how do we get from NSW’s current 3-D depiction to one that more fully 
represents what the USSOCOM strategy intended? 
Training for kinetic operations is still the dominant focus in the SEAL teams 
because it underscores the core capability of the community, which must never be 
compromised.  As Admiral Olson says, “The complexity of the present strategic 
environment requires that SOF operators maintain not only the highest levels of war 
fighting expertise but also regional knowledge and diplomacy skills.”100  Kinetic skill 
sets remain an important part of counterinsurgency.  Keeping this in mind, we offer the 
following recommendations.  
1. Manning SOCCEs or Other 3-D Jobs 
a. Discussion  
Chapter III describes how the interagency mission for NSW (SOCCE, 
which is now called Special Operations Forces Liaison Element [SOFLE]) is being filled 
with operators who are inadequately prepared for the 3-D mission.  The interagency 
                                                 
100 Eric T. Olson in USSOCOM Strategy, 2010, 2. 
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mission is about engendering long-term relationships and maintaining continuity to 
establish effective host nation programs of instruction to build CT/COIN capacity.  
Unfortunately, in the case of the Nigeria SOCCE, the lack of 3-D centric training coupled 
with the high frequency turnover with SEALs every six months (now every three months 
due to an increased SEAL team rotational cycle) is compromising the overall mission and 
sacrificing credibility with the country team. 
b. Recommendation  
NSWAD operators, not SEAL team operators, are fit to fulfill 
SOFLE/SOCCE jobs because the training meets the needs of the environment and the 
extended deployments facilitate building rapport. The episodic JCETs in each country 
should still be executed by SEAL platoons cycling in and out of country to conduct the 
exercise.  However, the billet on the Embassy Country Teams should be filled by SEALs 
who have regional expertise, have diplomatic and development training, and execute 
multiple extended tours to that embassy in the Key Partner Nation—becoming the 
“Lawrence of Arabia’s” within NSW. 
2. NSWAD Manpower 
a. Discussion  
NSW has a limited number of regionally trained operators with diplomatic 
and development skill sets.  Currently NSW does not have the 3-D depth to fill every 
SOFLE or other 3-D mission with an operator who fits that environment.  Rather, these 
positions are filled with kinetically trained SEAL team operators.  USSOCOM 
emphasizes core capability; thus, it is important for SEAL team operators to train to the 




b. Recommendation   
NSW should bolster its IW capacity by growing NSWAD operators.  
NSWAD operators need to grow in numbers because staffing 3-D positions with SEAL 
team operators degrades core capability and damages diplomatic and development 
efforts.    
3. Incentives 
a. Discussion  
In order to grow the NSWAD force an incentive structure needs to be in 
place that effectively encourages SEALs to break away from the traditional mission set.  
Current incentives fail to bridge the cultural gap created by the NSWADs initiative. In 
other words, what can NSWADs offer the SEAL team operator that entices him to depart 
from a kinetic mindset?  For example, the first incentive listed in the NSWADs 
TASKORD is that the individual assigned to NSWADs will receive extensive language 
and cultural training.  We feel it is fair to assume that most SEAL operators did not join 
to become language or cultural experts.  Therefore, this really is not an incentive and, in 
some cases, may be perceived as a punishment.  The second incentive listed in the 
NSWAD TASKORD is that the service member will be allowed to maintain the same 
home duty station for four years.101  While this may give the NSWAD operator’s family 
a greater degree of continuity, that NSWAD operator is likely to be away from home and 
family for training and deployments for at least two out of those four years.  Therefore, 
there is no significant difference between time away from home at an NSWAD and a 
SEAL team.  In order for people to sustain high levels of performance over the long-term 
in jobs atypical to traditional SEAL missions, effective incentives must be evident. 
b. Recommendation  
Make NSWADs a more attractive billet.  For example, diminish the 
hardship of a full year away from family by allowing NSWAD operator’s family 
                                                 
101 Winters, III, Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, Tasking Order for Naval Special 
Warfare Anchor Detachments, Coronado, CA, December 2009. 
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accompanied tours to embassy country teams where possible. Prove to NSWAD 
operators that they are valued members of the NSW organization by offering choice sets 
of orders after NSWAD commitment. These are two incentives we feel would be 
effective; a financial incentive would also increase NSWAD attractiveness.  Regardless, 
NSW should make a greater investment of NSWADs incentives to benefit the community 
and produce greater dividends in the long term. 
USSOCOM has made tremendous strides in moving towards embracing 
the softer side of special operations by emphasizing diplomacy and development skill sets 
to get to the root of global extremism.  The greatest challenge currently with the 3-D 
operator concept is NSW finding the right balance between training for diplomacy and 
development missions versus defense—specifically the legacy SEAL team kinetic 
training cycle.  If NSW can work toward implementing these recommendations we feel 
that it will be better prepared to combat our nation’s adversaries in the 3-D environment.  
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APPENDIX A. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF NAVAL SPECIAL 
WARFARE COMMAND (NAVSPECWARCOM) 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER (NSWC) 
The NSWC is based at Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Coronado, CA. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• Schoolhouse for NSW training. 
• 26-week BUD/S course. 
• Nine-week Special Warfare Combat Crewman (SWCC) course. 
• Advanced maritime special operations training. 
• Maintains a detachment at the NAB, Little Creek, VA for training of East 
Coast personnel. 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT GROUP (NSWDG) 
The NSWDG is located in Dam Neck Naval Base, VA. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• Conducts tests, evaluations, and development of current and emerging 
technology. 
• Develops maritime ground and airborne tactics. 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP ONE (NSWG-1) 
NSWG-1 is located in Coronado, CA at NAB. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• Operational and administrative control, of ST-1, ST-3, ST-5, ST-7, 
LOGSU-1, and SA-1. 
• Administrative control of NSWU-1 (Guam) and NSWU-3 (Bahrain). 
• NSWG-1 concentrates on the Pacific and Central Areas of Responsibility 
(AOR). 
SEAL TEAMS ONE, THREE, FIVE, SEVEN (ST-1/3/5/7) 
ST-1/3/5/7 are located in Coronado, CA at NAB 
• Commanded by a Navy commander (O-5). 
• Comprise of one headquarters (HQ) unit and three NSW troops that have 
two 16-man SEAL platoons each. 
• Provide administrative and tactical support to three troops/six operational 





NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP TWO (NSWG-2) 
NSWG-2 is located in Virginia Beach, VA at NAB Little Creek. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• Operational and administrative control, of ST-2, ST-4, ST-8, ST-10, 
LOGSU-2, and SA-2. 
• Administrative control of NSWU-2 (Germany) and NSWU-10 (Germany). 
• NSWG-2 concentrates on the Southern, European, African and Central 
AORs. 
SEAL TEAMS TWO, FOUR, EIGHT, TEN (ST-2/4/8/10) 
ST-2/4/8/10 are located in Virginia Beach, VA at NAB Little Creek. 
• Commanded by a Navy commander (O-5). 
• Comprise of one HQ unit and three NSW troops that have two 16-man 
SEAL platoons each. 
• Provide administrative and tactical support to three troops/six operational 
platoons charged with conducting Special Operations in the Southern, 
European, African, and Central AORs. 
SPECIAL ACTIVITY TEAMS ONE, TWO (SA-1/2) 
NSWG-2 is located in Virginia Beach, VA at NAB Little Creek. 
• Commanded by a Navy commander (O-5). 
• Comprised of one HQ unit, Cross Functional Troops, NSWADs, and one 
Cultural Engagement Team. 
• The Special Activity Team mission is to man, train, equip, organize, and 
deploy forces to conduct Preparation of the Environment (PE); 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR); Special Operations 
(SO); and Combat Support (CS) for Commanders, Interagency, and Host 
Nation Partners. 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP THREE (NSWG-3) 
NSWG-3 is located in Coronado, CA at NAB. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• Operational and administrative control of all undersea NSW programs and 
commands to include SDVT-1 (Hawaii) and SDV Det-2 (Little Creek, 
VA). 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP FOUR (NSWG-4) 
NSWG-4 is located in Virginia Beach, VA at NAB Little Creek. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• Operational and Administrative Control of SBT-12, SBT-20, SBT-22. 
• Mission is to organize, train, equip and deploy NSW personnel and 
maritime mobility systems. 
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NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNIT ONE (NSWU-1) 
NSWU-1 is located in Guam at the Naval Base. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• A small command charged with logistical support for SEALs conducting 
Special Operations and building partnerships via the Theater Security 
Cooperation Plan (TSCP) in the Pacific AOR. 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNIT THREE (NSWU-3) 
NSWU-3 is located in Bahrain at the Naval Base. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• A small command charged with logistical support for SEALs conducting 
Special Operations, planning for exercises and contingencies, and building 
partnerships via the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) in the 
Central AOR. 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNIT TWO (NSWU-2) 
NSWU-2 is located in Stuttgart, Germany at the Patch Barracks. 
• Commanded by a Navy captain (O-6). 
• A small command charged with logistical support for SEALs conducting 
Special Operations, planning for exercises and contingencies, and building 
partnerships via the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) in the 
European AOR. 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNIT TEN (NSWU-10) 
• NSWU-10 is located in Stuttgart, Germany at the Patch Barracks. 
• Commanded by a Navy commander (O-5). 
• A small command charged with logistical support for SEALs conducting 
Special Operations, planning for exercises and contingencies, and building 
partnerships via the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) in the 
African AOR. 
SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE TEAM ONE (SDVT-1) 
SDVT-1 is based in Pearl Harbor, HI.  
• Commanded by a Navy commander (O-5). 
• SDVT-1 conducts undersea special operations throughout the globe. 
• Has three SDV, Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) troops and a headquarters 
element. 
• Each SDV/DDS Troops can deploy independently of submarines, but can 






SPECIAL BOAT TEAM TWELVE (SBT-12) 
SBT-12 is based in Coronado, CA at NAB. 
• SBT-12 is comprised of Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) Detachments 
and Mk V Special Operations Craft (SOC) detachments.  Each detachment 
is comprised of two boats. 
• SBT-12 supports open-water special operations in the Pacific and Central 
AORs as well as training for Coronado based SEAL Teams. 
SPECIAL BOAT TEAM TWENTY (SBT-20) 
SBT-20 is based in Virginia Beach, VA at NAB Little Creek. 
• SBT-20 is comprised of Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) Detachments 
and Mk V Special Operations Craft (SOC) detachments.  Each detachment 
is comprised of two boats. 
• SBT-20 supports open-water special operations in the European, Southern, 
African and Central AORs as well as training for Little Creek based SEAL 
Teams. 
SPECIAL BOAT TEAM TWENTY-TWO (SBT-22) 
SBT-22 is based in Stennis, MS. 
• Commanded by a Navy commander (O-5) 
• Consists of a HQ element and four Special Operations Craft—Riverine 
(SOCR) Troops.  Each troop consists of two SOCR detachments and each 
detachment consists of two SOCRs. 
• SBT-22 focuses on providing insert, extraction, and Quick Reaction Force 
support for SEALs conducting Special Operations in riverine 




APPENDIX B. UJTL TASK LINKAGES 
Taken from the Universal Joint Task Manual CJCSM 3500.04E, Appendix A 
Enclosure B (B-A-7-8): An example of vertical linkages in the UJTL is illustrated in 
Figure 11 with maneuver tasks. This illustrates the stakeholders at strategic and 
operational levels and the design used to influence the task lists required by an NSW 
troop or other tactical unit. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Task Linkages Across the Levels of War 
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(1) Figure B-2 [Figure 11] displays the tasks involved in bringing forces to 
bear on an enemy. In one of the first actions, forces might have to conduct 
a theater strategic movement and maneuver (ST 1, “Deploy, Concentrate, 
and Maneuver Theater Forces”) based on a request from a JFC. Once in 
the theater of operations, or joint operations area, it may be necessary to 
further deploy these forces (OP 1.1.2, “Conduct Intratheater Deployment 
and Redeployment of Forces within the Joint Operations Area”) into 
positions that will respond to enemy force movements. The movement 
will give them a relative advantage over enemy forces and support the 
JFC's intent for his subordinate campaign plan. At the same time, joint 
forces in the joint operations area could be maneuvering (OP 1, “Conduct 
Operational Movement and Maneuver,” and OP 1.2 “Conduct Operational 
Maneuver and Force Positioning”) to put forces into a position from which 
they can deploy and conduct tactical maneuver (TA 1, “Deploy/Conduct 
Maneuver”) and employ direct and indirect fires. Included in this is the 
transitioning of forces to battle formation (OP 1.2.1, “Coordinate the 
Transition of Joint Forces to and from Tactical Battle Formations”). At the 
tactical LOW, maneuver deals with achieving positional advantage over 
an enemy force in conjunction with fire support. 
(2) Figure B-2 [Figure 11] can also be viewed from a bottom-up 
perspective as shown by the dotted line from the tactical level to the 
operational level. In this case, the results of a tactical-level maneuver (TA 
1, “Deploy/Conduct Maneuver”) could achieve an advantageous position 
over the enemy. At the tactical level, a penetration, or flanking maneuver 
might achieve tactical success and permit maneuver to operational depths 
(exploitation and pursuit), helping to achieve operational and theater 
strategic objectives (OP 1, “Conduct Operational Movement and 
Maneuver”). (3) The vertical linking of the tasks across levels of the UJTL 
can be used to make connections between related capabilities at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic LOWs and illustrate how an inadequate 
capability at any LOW can impact the ability of a joint force to integrate 
that capability across the three LOWs. Such linkages exist in all general 
task areas of the UJTL, to include movement and maneuver, intelligence, 
firepower, sustainment, command and control, and protection. 
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